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ARTICLES
THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW
Nathan B. Oman*
While combativeness is central to how our culture both experiences and
conceptualizes litigation, we generally notice it only as a regrettable cost.
This Article offers a less squeamish vision, one that sees in the struggle of
people suing one another a morally valuable activity: the vindication of
insulted honor. This claim is offered as a normative defense of a civil
recourse approach to private law. According to civil recourse theorists,
tort and contract law should be seen as empowering plaintiffs to act against
defendants, rather than as economically optimal incentives or as a means of
enforcing duties of corrective justice. The justification of civil recourse
must answer three questions. First, under what circumstances—if any—is
one justified in acting or retaliating against a wrongdoer? Second, under
what circumstances does the state have reasons for providing a mechanism
for such action? Finally, how are the answers to these questions related to
the current structure of our private law? This Article offers the vindication
of wronged honor as an answer to these three questions. First, I establish
the historical connection between honor and litigation by looking at the
quintessential honor practice, dueling. Then I argue that the vindication of
honor is normatively attractive. I do this by divorcing the idea of honor
from unsavory associations with violence and aristocracy, showing how it
can be made congruent with certain core modern concerns. In particular,
when insulted parties act against wrongdoers, they reestablish the position
of respect and equality that the insult upset. I then show how having the
state provide plaintiffs with a means of vindicating their honor avoids
making the political community complicit in the humiliation of its citizens
and provides those citizens with a means of exercising their agency in ways
that provide a foundation for self-respect. Finally, I show those areas of
private law where honor operates most powerfully as a justification for
providing recourse through the courts, while acknowledging that it
operates less powerfully as a reason in other areas.
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INTRODUCTION
Suing someone is an aggressive act. Friends almost by definition do not
sue each other. Family members only sue one another when the bonds of
affection have been torn asunder by contention, rivalry, and wrongdoing.
When a victim tells a tortfeasor, “I am going to sue you!” he is not making
some abstract statement about the legal consequence of negligence. Rather,
he is threatening to strike back at the person who hurt him. Likewise,
litigation is a gladiatorial enterprise, a struggle between opposing
champions bent on claiming victory for their clients. It is common to speak
of lawyers as “hired guns” or “junkyard dogs.” 1 The unusually litigious are
seen as being touchy, contentious, and aggressive. 2 Oddly, while
combativeness is central to how our culture both experiences and
conceptualizes litigation, this fact has garnered very little scholarly
attention. At best, it is noticed as a regrettable cost of the legal system. 3
This Article articulates a less squeamish vision of litigation, one that sees in
the very struggle of people suing one another a morally valuable activity:
the vindication of insulted honor.
1. This was our family’s affectionate designation for my great uncle, a successful
plaintiff’s attorney in Utah who made his fortune representing farmers and ranchers in suits
against railroads and mining companies.
2. See generally PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994); ROBERT A.
KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); WALTER K. OLSON,
THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT
(1991).
3. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 100–01 (2000) (discussing bitter litigation between Art
Buchwald and Paramount Pictures and noting that “[t]heir process for resolving their dispute
was so inefficient that fighting the battle cost six times more than the amount awarded”).

2011]

THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW

33

Private law theory is dominated by two philosophical families. On one
side are consequentialists, best represented by the partisans of law and
economics, who believe that areas such as torts and contracts should be
arranged so as to create efficient incentives. 4 On the other side are various
rights-based theorists who believe that private law can and should serve
non-instrumentalist goals.5 Among this latter group a debate has developed
between the partisans of corrective justice and the partisans of civil recourse
theory. 6 Occurring mainly within tort theory but bleeding into contracts
scholarship as well, the dispute hinges on whether private law should be
thought of as enforcing a wrongdoer’s duty to make the victim of his
wrongdoing whole or whether tort and contract should be thought of as
institutions that empower plaintiffs to act against defendants.
To date, the civil recourse theorists have relied primarily on formalistic
arguments, if one can use the term “formalistic” in a non-pejorative sense.
The recourse theorists have sought to show how their approach better fits
the institutional structures of private law. They have been less successful at
explaining the normative value of allowing plaintiffs to act against
defendants. To the extent that such normative arguments have appeared,
they have overwhelmingly been couched in the language of individual
rights and liberal political philosophy. In contrast, this Article justifies civil
recourse by appealing to the idea of honor rather than to liberal notions of
rights. In so doing, it seeks to connect debates in the theory of private law
to a recent surge of interest, among historians and other scholars in the
humanities, in the idea of honor.7
The normative problem of civil recourse can be broken into at least three
discrete but inter-related questions. First, there is the question of under
what circumstances—if any—one is justified in acting or retaliating against
a wrongdoer. Can such action be justified? Second, there is the question of
under what circumstances the state has a good reason for providing a
mechanism for such action. Even if one is justified in retaliating against a
wrongdoer, what reason is there for the state to involve itself in the process?
Finally, assuming that we have answers to the previous two questions, how

4.
5.
6.
7.

See infra notes 11–18 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text.
See infra Part I.B.
See generally KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE HONOR CODE: HOW MORAL
REVOLUTIONS HAPPEN (2010); JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL
POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (2002); SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR
(2002); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, BLOODTAKING AND PEACEMAKING: FEUD, LAW, AND SOCIETY
IN SAGA ICELAND (1990); WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE (2006); WILLIAM IAN
MILLER, HUMILIATION: AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE
(1993); FRANK HENDERSON STEWART, HONOR (1994); ALEXANDER WELSH, WHAT IS
HONOR?: A QUESTION OF MORAL IMPERATIVES (2008); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN,
SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH (25th anniversary ed. 2007);
Alison L. LaCroix, To Gain the Whole World and Lose His Own Soul: Nineteenth-Century
American Dueling as Public Law and Private Code, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 501 (2004); C.A.
Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in Antebellum
America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805 (2001); Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Recognition
Respect for Persons (2009) (unpublished paper) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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are those answers related to the current structure of our private law? Are
the civil wrongs that currently give rise to a private cause of action the sort
of wrongs that justify acting or retaliating against a wrongdoer? Do the
reasons that justify the state’s involvement in this process apply equally to
all civil wrongs or does civil recourse provide a more powerful justification
for empowering plaintiffs in some circumstances rather than others?
This Article offers answers to all three of these questions. It focuses on a
single feature of civil recourse, namely, the way in which the law empowers
plaintiffs to act against defendants. Rather than looking to liberal theories
of rights, however, it looks to older notions of honor and its vindication,
showing not only how these ideas continue to motivate our laws but also
why we might want them to do so. I begin the argument by establishing a
connection between the common law and the vindication of wronged honor
through an exploration of the relationship between litigation and the
quintessential practice of honor: dueling. Having established the
connection between honor and litigation, I then turn to the three normative
questions posed by civil recourse theory.
First, I argue that the vindication of honor is a normatively attractive
form of action. I do this by divorcing the idea of honor from unsavory
associations with violence and aristocracy, showing how it can be made
congruent with certain core modern concerns. In particular, when insulted
parties act against the wrongdoers that have victimized them, they
reestablish the position of respect and equality that the insult upset. I then
show how having the state provide plaintiffs with a means of vindicating
their honor both avoids making the political community complicit in the
humiliation of its citizens and provides those citizens with the means for
exercising their agency in ways that provide a foundation for honor and
self-respect. Finally, I show those areas of private law where honor
operates most powerfully as a justification for providing recourse through
the courts while acknowledging that honor operates less powerfully as a
reason in other areas.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
and opinionated overview of modern private law theory, showing how this
Article’s argument about honor fits into contemporary scholarly debates.
Part II illustrates the close connection between honor and civil recourse by
examining the historical relationship between litigation and the practice of
dueling. Part III then offers a normative defense of civil recourse based on
the vindication of honor. The Article concludes by discussing some of the
implications and limitations of the defense of honor offered herein.
I. THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAW
For most of the last century the idea of private law as a conceptually
distinct subject has been treated with suspicion. Beginning at least with the
publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s The Path of the Law, many, if not
most, legal thinkers have assumed that private law is best thought of as

2011]

THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW

35

simply an idiosyncratic form of public regulation.8 To be sure, the
distinction between private law and public law has never disappeared from
legal discourse, but for many it is something of a theoretical
embarrassment. 9 The present, however, is an unusually fertile moment in
the theory of private law. The field now has the benefit of two generations
of sophisticated law and economics scholarship devoted to interpreting,
elucidating, and critiquing the law of contracts, tort, and property. More
recently, philosophers of law have turned their attention to the area, offering
criticisms of economic interpretations of the law and putting forward
counter-theories. The result is a rich intellectual discussion, one that is
again exploring the distinctive character of private law. To understand the
contribution that honor might make to our understanding of private law, it is
necessary to see how it fits into this ongoing debate.
A. Law and Economics and the Corrective Justice Response
Modern private law theory began in 1960. Picking such dates is always
arbitrary, but in that year Ronald Coase published his article The Problem
of Social Cost, 10 which formulated what afterwards became known as the
Coase Theorem. 11 This argument laid the foundation for much of modern
law and economics scholarship, providing a framework that scholars could
apply to a wide range of topics. Coase’s article was followed by other
seminal pieces in the 1960s, and by the 1970s, law and economics had
taken shape as a distinctive approach to legal theory with the publication of

8. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461–65
(1897) (arguing that law—including private law such as tort and contract—should be
conceptualized as an instrument serving public policy goals); see also David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97
HARV. L. REV. 849, 889–92 (1984) (arguing that tort law should be arranged to advance
regulatory goals).
9. Writing in the heyday of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Duncan Kennedy
declared, after working through the arguments in his eight-page article, that “one simply
loses one’s ability to take the public/private distinction seriously as a description, as an
explanation, or as a justification of anything.” Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of
the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982). Strangely enough,
closing in on three decades after the publication of Kennedy’s article, people continue to
refer to private law and public law on a regular basis.
10. See RONALD H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960),
reprinted in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988).
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (5th ed. 1998) (“The new
law and economics began with Guido Calabresi’s first article on torts and Ronald Coase’s
article on social cost.” (citing COASE, supra note 10; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961))). Coase himself never
formulated the Coase Theorem as a formal theorem, but this has not stopped others from
stepping into the breach. Posner’s definition reads, “The most celebrated application of the
concept of opportunity cost in the economic analysis of law is the Coase Theorem. The
theorem, slightly oversimplified . . . is that if transactions are costless, the initial assignment
of a property right will not affect the ultimate use of the property.” Id. at 8. See generally
Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic History of the Coase
Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397 (1997) (providing an intellectual history of the Coase
Theorem).
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Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents and Richard Posner’s Economic
Analysis of Law. 12
Law and economics, of course, is far more than a theory of private law.
If anything, it is hostile to divisions between private and public law,
preferring to see the whole of the corpus juris through the lens of economic
efficiency. 13 The key positive insight of law and economics scholarship is
that law creates incentives and that the effect of those incentives on
behavior can be modeled using the tools of neoclassical economics, the
rational actor model, and transaction-costs economics. 14 Its key normative
claim is that these incentives should be arranged so as to maximize
aggregate social wealth.15 There is nothing about either of these claims that
is necessarily confined to traditional private law fields such as torts and
contracts. Nevertheless, private law has proven a fertile area for law and
economics scholarship, leading one partisan of the approach to enthuse that
it “is the touchstone of private law scholarship, a key that appears to unlock
every door.” 16 Even more sober authors have declared, “As in private law
scholarship generally, economic analysis is the dominant paradigm in
contemporary contracts scholarship.” 17 Something very similar could be
said of the law of torts or property. 18
The very success of law and economics has acted as a spur to alternative
approaches to private law. After a period of relative neglect, more
12. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); POSNER, supra note 11; Calabresi, supra note 11. For a
somewhat hostile recounting of the rise of the law and economics movement, see GARY
MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY’S END
83–105 (1995).
13. Posner writes,
Among the disciplines that have challenged the legal doctrinalists’ monopoly of
legal studies, pride of place belongs to economics, which has made great progress
in the last thirty years and, applied to law, has revolutionized the profession’s
understanding of fields of law as disparate as antitrust, torts (mainly accidents),
contracts, corporations, and bankruptcy. At the academic level it has made inroads
into most other legal fields as well, ranging from adoption to zoning.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 84–85 (2d ed. 1995).
14. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 353 (1990) (noting that
the basic assumption of law and economics is that “people are rational maximizers of their
satisfaction”).
15. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, at xvii (2002)
(“Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their effects on the
welfare of individuals—and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of fairness, justice,
or cognate concepts.”). See generally Guido Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and
Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553 (1980) (defending the
desirability of efficiency as a normative criterion); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and
Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487
(1980) (same); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency? A Response to Professors
Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980) (attacking both arguments).
16. F.H. BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE: A THEORY OF CONTRACT, at xi (2005).
17. Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 687 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002).
18. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck,
92 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1141 n.58 (2007) (noting that law and economics is arguably the
dominant theoretical approach to tort law today).
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philosophically inclined theorists have once more turned their attention to
topics such as tort and contract. 19 The first round of philosophical work on
private law focused on the bilateralism of private law actions. Bilateralism
refers to the way in which plaintiffs and defendants are related in private
litigation so that money damages by defendants are always paid to plaintiffs
to whom the law gives no claim on anyone else.20 For example, in torts,
only victims can sue tortfeasors, and tortfeasors are the only people victims
can sue. They are not, for example, given a claim against a public
insurance fund. As philosophically minded critics of law and economics
scholarship have pointed out, if liability is supposed to be about the creation
of optimal incentives this bilateral structure makes no sense. 21 Indeed, the
point was noted earlier by economists, who recognize for example that
assessing expectation damages against contract breachers may force them to
internalize the costs of breach, leading to efficient breach decisions, but that
giving those damages to plaintiffs leads to over-reliance and inefficient
behavior on the part of promisees. 22 The payment to plaintiffs creates
moral hazard problems and there is no a priori economic reason that the
incentivizing of defendants should be left to the plaintiffs that they have
wronged. 23 A better justification of this feature, philosophical critics have
argued, can be found in the idea of corrective justice. 24
Corrective justice was first defined, rather enigmatically, by Aristotle,
who wrote, “[T]hat which is just in private transactions is indeed fair or
equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal; but the
proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion . . . but an
arithmetical one.” 25 The distinction Aristotle drew between geometric and
19. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 41–52 (2004) (summarizing
contemporary debates in the philosophy of contract law). See generally JULES L. COLEMAN,
RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
20. See Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Explanations of the Law of Contract
Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 846–51 (2007) (discussing the nature of
bilateralism).
21. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233 (1988)
(book review).
22. See generally Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-front
Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98
(1996); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and
Optimal Investment, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 478 (1996); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance,
Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691 (1983); William P. Rogerson,
Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39
(1984); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466
(1980); Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON.
121 (1984).
23. See Coleman, supra note 21, at 1240–47 (offering a philosophical critique of
economic explanations of tort law’s bilateral structure); Oman, supra note 20, at 846–59
(making a similar argument in the context of contract law).
24. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 21, at 1248–53; Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the
Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403, 409–11 (1992).
25. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (F.H. Peters trans., C. Kegan
Paul & Co. 1881).
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arithmetic ideas corresponds to the distinction between distributive and
corrective justice. In referring to their mathematical properties, Aristotle
was seeking to elucidate their basic structure rather than their substantive
content, a distinction similar to that drawn by John Rawls between the
concept of justice and various conceptions of justice. 26 The concept of
distributive justice is geometrical because it allocates the good things of life
to people in proportion to their possession of some morally relevant
characteristic. The characteristic chosen by different conceptions of
distributive justice varies. For egalitarians, this might be humanity, which
all people possess in equal measure, while for philosophical aristocrats, it
might be virtue, which some have in greater abundance than others.
Corrective justice, in contrast, is indifferent to the moral characteristics of
different people, but simply seeks to correct transactional wrongs by
arithmetically subtracting from a wrongdoer to compensate her victim.27
Corrective justice theorists of private law have argued among themselves
over precisely how the idea should be interpreted. The chief point of
contention is whether the idea requires fault on the part of a defendant or
whether the mere invasion of a plaintiff’s rights should give rise to a duty to
compensate. 28 All agree, however, that wrongdoers have such a duty to
make their victims whole, and that the bilateral structure of private
litigation enforces this duty. 29
B. The Civil Recourse Critique of Corrective Justice
The most recent round of private law revivalism has focused on a
different feature of civil liability: private standing. 30 Private standing
26. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 9 (rev. ed. 1999) (“The concept of justice I
take to be defined, then, by the role of its principles in assigning rights and duties and in
defining the appropriate division of social advantages. A conception of justice is an
interpretation of this role.”).
27. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (“For it makes no difference
whether a good man defrauds a bad one, or a bad man a good one, nor whether a man who
commits an adultery be a good or a bad man; the law looks only to the difference created by
the injury, treating the parties themselves as equal, and only asking whether the one has
done, and the other suffered, injury or damage.”).
28. Compare JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001), COLEMAN, supra note 19, Jules L.
Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427 (1992), Jules L.
Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15 (1995), Jules L. Coleman,
Property, Wrongfulness and the Duty to Compensate, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1987), and
Coleman, supra note 21, with WEINRIB, supra note 19, Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and
Wrongdoing, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987), Weinrib, supra note 24, Ernest J. Weinrib,
Corrective Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002), Ernest J. Weinrib,
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2001), and Ernest J. Weinrib, Non-Relational Relationships:
A Note on Coleman’s New Theory, 77 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1992).
29. For an argument that as a matter of existing law no such duty to pay damages exists,
see Nathan B. Oman, Why There Is No Duty to Pay Damages: Powers, Duties, and Private
Law, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1906753.
30. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003)
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refers to the fact that the law does not force transfers from defendants to
plaintiffs as an independent enforcer of some norm of corrective justice.31
Rather, the private law empowers plaintiffs to act against defendants.
Plaintiffs may choose to bring suit against tortfeasors and contract
breachers, but the law does not require that they do so. Rather, it waits
entirely on the plaintiff’s decision to sue. Until she brings an action,
nothing happens. Benjamin Zipursky and John Goldberg, the chief
proponents of what has been dubbed civil recourse theory, have argued that
this plaintiff-centered system of private law cannot be adequately explained
by either economic analysis or the duty of corrective justice.32
Economic theorists might seek to justify private standing by arguing that
it represents a form of dispersed enforcement. The idea is that we need a
system of penalties for breach of contract or sub-optimal investment in
precautions to avoid torts. 33 The information and resources of government
prosecutors, however, are limited, so we empower the plaintiff as a kind of
private attorney general to enforce efficiency norms. 34 The problem with
such an argument is that it fails to explain why the plaintiff must be the
victim of the defendant.35 If our only goal is disaggregated enforcement,
then information of wrongdoing, rather than the fact of being victimized,
ought to be sufficient to empower plaintiffs.36 Indeed, this is precisely what
we see in systems that are explicitly designed as disaggregated enforcement
mechanisms, such as qui tam actions under whistle-blower statutes. 37 In
such cases the plaintiff need not be a victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing
but may sue as a way of enforcing public policy merely on the basis of
information. 38
Corrective justice theory faces a similar difficulty. The idea of corrective
justice explains why a wrongdoer ought to have a duty to compensate his
victim. It is not clear, however, that empowering plaintiffs is best explained
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623 (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) [hereinafter Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law].
31. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 699 (“The state does not impose
liability on its own initiative. It does so in response to a plaintiff’s suit demanding that the
defendant be so required.”).
32. See id. at 699–709 (critiquing the law and economics approach); id. at 709–33
(critiquing corrective justice theory); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse
in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45–52 (1998) (critiquing the law and economics
approach); id. at 70–82 (critiquing corrective justice theory); see also Goldberg, supra note
30, at 601–05 (contrasting corrective justice and civil recourse).
33. See Oman, supra note 23, at 843–46 (discussing economic theories of disaggregated
enforcement). See generally Nathan B. Oman, Consent to Retaliation: A Civil Recourse
Theory of Contractual Liability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 529 (2011) (same).
34. See Oman, supra note 20, at 858 (discussing dispersed enforcement of contract
liabilities).
35. See id. (noting “the basic contradiction between efficient breach and efficient
reliance”).
36. See id. at 858–59 (highlighting economic arguments).
37. See id. at 858 (“In a qui tam action, the successful plaintiff is essentially paid a
bounty for bringing a lawsuit that, rather than righting a personal wrong, serves simply to
enforce a public policy.”).
38. Id.
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as an effort to enforce this duty. 39 For example, one could create a system
in which one had a duty to compensate and where the failure to perform this
duty was a crime. 40 In other words, the duty to compensate might be
enforced by prosecutors.
Understanding private litigation as the
disaggregated enforcement of such a duty runs into the same sorts of
problems that seeing private litigation as the disaggregated enforcement of
efficiency-promoting fines faces. Limiting the enforcement to actions by
victims is something that Aristotle’s arithmetical principle does not
explain. 41 Rather, Aristotle tells us to subtract from wrongdoers and add to
victims but seems indifferent as to who does the counting, adding, and
subtracting. 42
Recourse theorists insist that there is some distinctive normative goal that
is vindicated by giving citizens the ability to proceed in court against those
that have wronged them. Zipursky and Goldberg’s normative defense of
civil recourse is based on a reading of Locke’s Second Treatise on
Government. 43 According to Locke, all men in the state of nature have the
right to enforce natural law by acting to punish those who violate its
demands. 44 It is the delegation of this right to enforce natural law that gives
rise to the state’s power to legislate and punish crime. 45 This delegation is
39. Cf. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 714–18 (noting the difficulties with
understanding tort law as enforcing duties of corrective justice).
40. Cf. id. at 712–13 (highlighting another critique of corrective justice theory).
41. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. V, ch. 4, at 148 (“[T]hat which is just in private
transactions is indeed fair or equal in some sort, and that which is unjust is unfair or unequal;
but the proportion to be observed here is not a geometrical proportion . . . but an arithmetical
one.”).
42. But see Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts: A Reply to
Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1023, 1028–32 (2005) (arguing
that Aristotle’s claim that consent vitiates injustice explains why corrective justice requires
the empowering of victims). I do not find Calnan’s argument persuasive. It seems to me
that Aristotle uses the notion of consent to explain why there is no duty to repair an injury
suffered as a result of consented-to activity, such as injuries suffered in the boxing ring.
Calnan, it seems to me, unjustifiably extends this principle to require some further choice by
the victim after the fact in order for the duty to compensate to arise.
43. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 735 (discussing Locke); see also
Goldberg, supra note 30, at 541–44 (same); cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of
Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873 (2011) (arguing that private law instantiates
pre-legal moral enforcement rights).
44. Locke writes:
[T]hat all Men may be restrained from invading others Rights, and from doing hurt
to one another, and the Law of Nature be observed, which willeth the Peace and
Preservation of all Mankind, the Execution of the Law of Nature is in that State
[i.e., the state of nature], put into every Mans hands, whereby every one has a right
to punish the transgressors of that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its
Violation.
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 289 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1960) (1690).
45. See id. at 342 (“And thus the Commonwealth comes by a Power to set down, what
punishment shall belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it,
committed amongst the Members of that Society, (which is the power of making Laws) as
well as it has the power to punish any Injury done unto any of its Members, by any one that
is not of it, (which is the power of War and Peace;) and all this for the preservation of the
property of all the Members of that Society, as far as is possible.”).
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not absolute. In addition to the right to punish transgressors of natural law,
writes Locke, man “has besides the right of punishment common to him
with other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him that has
done it.” 46 This right to seek reparations for damage done is, like the right
to self-defense, inalienable. 47 Accordingly, the state must provide an
avenue that allows for the citizen’s “appropriating to himself, the Goods or
Service of the Offender,” 48 if it is going to prohibit self-help with the
criminal law and the like.
C. Justifying Civil Recourse
While Zipursky and Goldberg have offered a reading of Locke’s Second
Treatise in support of civil recourse theory, they have not yet offered a
comprehensive normative defense. 49 For example, while they have offered
an interpretation of Locke’s writings, they have not tried to explicitly link
civil recourse theory to Lockean ideas of self-ownership. 50 They thus fail
to explain exactly how the fictitious Lockean social contract operates as a
justification. 51 Civil recourse theory identifies an important structural
feature of private law actions. Goldberg and Zipursky have made a
plausible case that this feature rests on a normative foundation independent
of corrective justice or economic efficiency. The precise nature of that
normative foundation, however, remains open to debate and interpretation.
Jane Stapleton, for example, has taken issue with numerous aspects of
Goldberg and Zipursky’s theory. 52 At the heart of Stapleton’s criticism is
her pluralistic approach to tort.53 Accordingly, she is skeptical of what she
calls “the extremes of ‘high theory’ fashions” and “the race to the

46. Id. at 291.
47. Id. at 291–92 (describing the right to reparation for damage done and noting that one
“cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private Man, for the damage he has received”).
48. See id. at 292.
49. See Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV.
1765, 1779 (2009) (noting that civil recourse theorists have not offered a full normative
justification of their position).
50. Cf. Andrew S. Gold, A Property Theory of Contract, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 13–17
(2009) (offering a detailed theory of the substantive basis of contractual obligations based on
Lockean theories of property acquisition).
51. As Zipursky has written:
The Lockian social contract metaphor cannot take much pressure, as
sympathetic critics from Hume to Rawls have pointed out. The metaphor is often
taken as a placeholder for a broader argument based on the existence of reasons for
members of a group of persons within a state to regard a state bounded by certain
norms as legitimate and authoritative and to act as members of it, reasons
conditioned on the like-minded acceptance of other persons in the state. This is
not the place to undertake the project of unpacking the metaphor; a vast
contractarian and anti-contractarian literature exists on this topic. But assuming it
is not incoherent generally to try to unpack contractarian arguments in this manner,
it is worth looking at what it would mean in the context of private rights of action.
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 642.
52. Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529 (2006).
53. See id. at 1557 (expressing frustration with grand theories of tort law).
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reductionist bottom of legal analysis in U.S. tort discourse.” 54 She takes
particular issue with the defense that Goldberg and Zipursky mount of
Cardozo’s famous opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.55
Zipursky insists that civil recourse reveals all tort duties as relational duties,
that is, duties owed to particular classes of people rather than to the world at
large. 56 Stapleton, however, believes that this view commits civil recourse
to a normatively unattractive vision in which some people are treated as
second-class citizens without a claim on the care of their fellows.57 She
also believes that “there are areas of tort law that can only be accounted for
in instrumental terms, for example torts that are explicitly based on the
violation of some public policy such as the tort of retaliation by an
employer against an employee.” 58
Coming from a very different position, Alan Calnan, a proponent of
corrective justice theory, has offered a critique of civil recourse based on
his more unitary approach to tort. 59 Calnan defends what he calls a liberal
justice theory of corrective justice.60 One of his chief criticisms is that civil
recourse theory, despite the protestations of its proponents, actually exalts
vengeance. “Goldberg argues,” he writes, “that the law uses compensatory
damage awards to exact retribution against wrongdoers, a practice which
presumably slakes the blood-thirst of their victims.” 61 Not only is the
slaking of blood thirst not normally seen as a morally attractive pursuit,
Calnan argues that money damages are a peculiarly bad way of doing it:
“Taking money is hardly the practical or moral equivalent of intentionally
or negligently inflicting harm. It is neither as severe nor as personal as the
action it requites.” 62 Civil recourse is thus doubly damned for both
pursuing normatively questionable ends and for doing so ineffectively.
One of the most ambitious attempts thus far to provide a normative
defense of civil recourse has been undertaken by Jason Solomon.63
Solomon begins by acknowledging the force of many of the criticisms
leveled against civil recourse theorists, noting that Zipursky and Goldberg
have thus far failed to provide a fully articulated normative justification for
their framework. 64 Solomon seeks to fill this gap through a two-part
argument. The first part of the argument seeks to rescue civil recourse
54. Id.
55. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
56. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 715–16 (discussing the holding in
Palsgraf).
57. Stapleton, supra note 52, at 1530–31 (criticizing treatment of some citizens in theory
as “second-class”).
58. Id. at 1531.
59. Calnan, supra note 42, at 1072 (“I have tried to show that the concept of corrective
justice explains a lot more of tort law then they are willing to admit.”).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1059.
62. Id.
63. Solomon, supra note 49.
64. See id. at 1779 (“Goldberg and Zipursky see their primary task as interpretive, and as
a result, have mostly avoided the task of defending a law of ‘civil recourse’ as one that is
worth having.”).
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theory by demonstrating that contrary to the claim put forward by John
Finnis and others, 65 we are morally justified in addressing resentment
against our wrongdoers and demanding some satisfaction from them.66
Solomon draws here on the work of Stephen Darwall, who has defended
what he calls the second-person standpoint. 67 On this view, morality
consists not only of abstract moral rules but also of moral powers that
victims have to make demands on their wrongdoers.68 There is a difference
between claiming that there is an abstract moral duty not to tread on other
people’s feet and a victim who says to a wrongdoer, “Hey! You stepped on
my foot!” This second example is a claim by the victim of peculiar moral
authority vis-à-vis the person standing on his foot. This claim of authority
is an instance of the second-person standpoint. 69 Solomon then seeks to
show how tort law embeds this second-person approach in our political
institutions. He writes, “From the state’s perspective, by establishing a
system whereby individuals can hold those who have wronged them legally
accountable, the state underscores the moral accountability we have toward
one another as well. The state does this simply by establishing the system
and making it available.” 70
To summarize, civil recourse theorists have identified an important
structural element of private law. An adequate interpretation of that law
requires an account of private standing. The justification for this feature,
however, remains in doubt. The remainder of this Article takes up the
normative question of civil recourse theory. Is it normatively desirable for
victims to act against those who have wronged them? Should the state
provide a means for them to do so? Do the current institutions of private
law fulfill this function? In the sections that follow, I argue that answers to
these questions can be found in the apparently anachronistic idea of honor.
I begin by showing the historical relationship between private law and
honor by recovering the surprising connection between litigation and
dueling.
II. DUELING AND CIVIL LITIGATION
The vindication of wronged honor was an important part of the private
law’s development of a system of redress. This connection between civil
recourse and the vindication of honor can be seen most dramatically in the
65. See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 30, at 57 (“At its root the
theory of recourse treats as worthy the emotional impulse of a victim of wrongdoing to ‘get
even,’ by ‘act[ing] against’—having recourse against—the rights-violator. This impulse is
in most if not all respects contrary to the true principle, do not answer injury with injury.”
(citing Zipursky, supra note 32, at 85)).
66. See Solomon, supra note 49, at 1785–97 (detailing the moral arguments behind such
a proposition).
67. See generally STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY,
RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
68. See id. at 99–104 (discussing moral accountability in second-person standpoint
theory).
69. See id. at 39–48 (highlighting examples of the second-person stance).
70. Solomon, supra note 49, at 1810.
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relationship between litigation and the quintessential mode of vindicating
one’s honor: the duel. During the heyday of the duel in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, litigation in court was consistently seen as a
competitor with pistols on the field of honor.71 Both social practices
involved a wronged victim acting against the person who insulted him in
order to vindicate his honor.
The idea that the common law exists to provide subjects and citizens with
a means of vindicating their honor has a long pedigree. In his influential
commentary on the Magna Carta in The Institutes of the Lawes of England,
Sir Edward Coke wrote:
The law is called rectum [right], because it discovereth, that which is tort,
crooked, or wrong, for as right signifieth law, so tort, crooked or wrong,
signifieth injurie . . . . It is called Right, because it is the best birth-right
the Subject hath, for thereby his . . . honor, and estimation are protected
from injury, and wrong . . . . 72

Likewise, when discussing the seriousness of being accused of treason,
Coke references the threat to “the life, honour, fame, liberty, blood, wife,
and posteritie of the party accused.” 73
Blackstone similarly associates the wheels of civil justice with the
vindication of personal honor. Citing Montesquieu approvingly, he writes:
[I]n free states the trouble, expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are
the price that every subject pays for his liberty, and in all governments, he
adds, the formalities of law increase in proportion to the value which is
set on the honour, the fortune, the liberty, and life of the subject. 74

Notice that Blackstone sees the complexity of judicial machinery as
being a result in part of the value placed on the honor of the subject. The
formalities of the law are necessary to vindicate the subject’s honor and
prevent overreaching by the state.
Elsewhere, Blackstone identifies the wrongs redressed by the private law
in terms of insults. “The more effectually to accomplish the redress of
private injuries,” he writes, “courts of justice are instituted in every
civilized society, in order to protect the weak from the insults of the
stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws by which rights are
defined, and wrongs prohibited.” 75 In seeing the common law as a bulwark
of the weak against the “insults of the stronger,” Blackstone was drawing
on a rhetorical trope that Coke had invoked a century and a half earlier.
Working his family motto into his commentary, Coke wrote, “That the
Common lawes of the Realme [are] . . . the surest sanctuary, that a man can
take, and the strongest fortresse to protect the weakest of all; lex est

71. See infra notes 78–95, 100–01 and accompanying text.
72. 2 EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE: INSTITUTES 872–
73 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003).
73. Id. at 949.
74. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *423–24.
75. Id. at *2–3.
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tutissima cassis, and sub clypeo legis nemo decipitur.”76 Like a knight
errant, the law was seen as the champion of the honor of the weak against
the insults of the strong. 77
The link between civil recourse and the vindication of honor can be seen
most clearly in the historical relationship between litigation and dueling.
Consider the rise of the eighteenth-century action of criminal conversation.
At common law, “crim con” as it was known was neither criminal nor a
conversation. Rather, it was a civil cause of action for cuckoldry in which a
wronged husband could sue his wife’s lover for money damages. 78 The
legal basis for the action lay in the doctrine of coventure, which merged a
wife’s legal identity into that of her husband, allowing him to sue her
paramour for what amounted to trespass. 79 (The misogyny inherent in the
theory behind the action did not go unremarked on by contemporary protofeminists.) 80 In the late seventeenth century, a cuckolded husband often
would challenge his wife’s lover to a duel as a way of vindicating his
honor. 81 With the rise of crim con in the eighteenth century, however,
dueling gave way to litigation. Rather than meeting on the field of honor,
husbands and lovers faced off in the courtroom, and rather than exacting
blood, a husband sought damages for the invasion of his “property.” The
size of judgments in crim con cases, coupled with England’s draconian debt
laws, often allowed husbands to use the civil courts to literally drive their
adversaries into exile. 82
Conflicts over infidelity were hardly the only area where law served as a
substitute for dueling over offended honor. Honor was also important for
76. 2 COKE, supra note 72, at 871. The Latin maxims translate as “law is the safest
helmet” and “under the shield of law no one is deceived.” Id. at 871 nn.151–52 (providing
translations of the Latin maxims).
77. Something of this basic sensibility is carried forward in the so-called “open courts”
provisions in thirty-nine state constitutions. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy,
65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992) (listing the thirty-nine state constitutional
provisions). Most of these provisions assert that the courts must be open “freely and without
purchase.” E.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Others state that courts must be available to redress
harms to “property or character.” E.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8. These constitutional
guarantees carry forward both aspects of the classical common law’s conception of civil
redress. First, they insist that the law must be available to the poor and the weak. Second,
they associate insults—wrongs to character and reputation—with the violation of personal
security or the security of one’s property.
78. See LAWRENCE STONE, ROAD TO DIVORCE: ENGLAND 1530–1987, at 231–300 (1990)
(giving the history of the action of criminal conversation from its rise at the end of the
seventeenth century to its abolition in 1857).
79. See id. at 231–34 (discussing the origins of criminal conversation actions in the writ
of trespass on the case).
80. One woman remarked in 1735:
Our law gives the husband the entire disposal of his wife’s person, but she does not
seem to retain any property in his. He may recover damages on any man who shall
invade his property in her, but she cannot recover damages for any woman who
shall invade her property in him.
Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
81. See id. at 237–41 (discussing dueling between husbands and lovers).
82. See id. at 236 (noting that during the eighteenth century, Boulogne and Calais hosted
large populations of English expatriates driven from their country by judgments in crim con
cases).
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the development of military law. According to Blackstone the court martial
is a “court of chivalry and honour,” 83 yet the idea of honor presented an
acute problem for eighteenth-century military law. Among British officers,
the ethos of gentlemanly honor, with its emphasis on courage and selfdiscipline, was an important aspect of military virtue. 84 Touchiness on
points of honor, however, frequently led to duels between officers. 85 The
resulting ill feelings, violence, injuries, and occasional deaths, in turn,
reduced military effectiveness.86 Accordingly, the Articles of War, which
formed the core of eighteenth-century military law, prohibited dueling.87
Officers, however, continued to require a mechanism with which to
vindicate their honor in the face of perceived slights.
This problem was solved by the charge of “conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman.” 88 As the lawyers of the Judge Advocate General
of the time noted, the offense was so vague as to raise what today would be
Nevertheless, the very
conceptualized as due process concerns.89
ambiguity of the offense proved useful. It allowed officers to charge one
another with “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman” in situations
that would otherwise have led to duels. 90 Courts martial in effect became
courts of honor in which insulted or otherwise aggrieved officers could
transform a literal confrontation with swords or pistols into a bloodless
tourney of litigation. 91 To be sure, the Articles of War and courts martial
were unable to entirely suppress dueling among officers, but they did limit
and channel it. 92
The relationship between litigation and dueling is also on display in the
politics of the early American republic, where affairs of honor became an
important part of public life. This can be seen most dramatically in the
death of Alexander Hamilton at the hands of Aaron Burr in a duel arising
out of Hamilton’s criticisms of Burr during the latter’s unsuccessful
gubernatorial bid in New York. 93 Joanne B. Freeman, however, has
documented the way in which the culture of honor permeated national
politics in the early republic. 94 According to the elaborate rules of the code
duello, litigation could act as a substitute for dueling depending on the

83. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *337.
84. See Arthur N. Gilbert, Law and Honour Among Eighteenth-century British Army
Officers, 19 HIST. J. 75, 75 (1976) (discussing the role of honor and courage).
85. See id. at 80 (noting that dueling continued despite official prohibition).
86. See id. at 79 (listing the consequences of dueling within the ranks).
87. See id. (reproducing the section of the Articles of War prohibiting dueling).
88. See id. at 76 (describing it as the “classic ‘honour’ crime”).
89. See id. at 77 (discussing the concerns of the Judge Advocate General).
90. See id. at 86 (highlighting the need for a legal method to resolve such disputes).
91. See id. at 87 (“In other words, the Court Martial could serve as a duelling substitute
and play a role in settling disputes which might otherwise have ended in the death of one of
the disputants.”).
92. Id. at 80.
93. See generally INTERVIEW IN WEEHAWKEN: THE BURR-HAMILTON DUEL AS TOLD IN
THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS (Harold C. Syrett & Jean G. Cooke eds., 1960) (documenting the
Burr-Hamilton duel).
94. See generally FREEMAN, supra note 7.
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social status of the offending party. Social equals—gentlemen—had to be
challenged to a duel in the case of insult, while a social inferior could be
sued in the courts for libel or defamation.95
The culture of dueling persisted into the nineteenth century, but became
increasingly fractured along sectional lines.96 In 1838, the Kentucky
Congressman William J. Graves killed the Maine Congressman Jonathan
Cilley in duel. 97 The affair garnered national attention and led to
widespread condemnation of dueling in the North, where the older code of
honor with its emphasis on gentlemanly touchiness about perceived slights
and insults was replaced by a more commercial vision of honor centered on
personal honesty and trustworthiness. 98 In such a vision, litigation
provided an adequate substitute for the code duello. “No longer
constitutive of the individual’s entire identity and unable to adapt to the
modern world, the code of honor ceded the field to the narrower, legal
modes of satisfaction.” 99
It is important to realize that the code of honor was never confined
merely to stylized insults. For example, Andrew Jackson, one of the most
notorious duelists in American history, was reportedly counseled by his
mother, “Never . . . sue anybody for slander or assault and battery. Always
settle them cases yourself!” 100 The story is interesting for two reasons.
First, Jackson’s mother saw dueling and litigation as potential substitutes
for one another. Second, her sense of honor extended beyond mere insults
to traditional torts like assault and battery, with the content of honor’s
protected sphere being defined by legal language. Indeed, one of the last
duels fought in the South, at Savannah in 1877, arose out of a dispute over a
contract between two lawyers. 101
None of this discussion is meant to imply that the common law in some
way endorsed dueling. To the contrary, the law sought with varying
degrees of success to suppress dueling. 102 Blackstone, for example,
discusses dueling in the chapter of his Commentaries devoted to homicide.
There he castigated the practice as one where “both parties meet avowedly
with an intent to murder . . . in direct contradiction to the laws of both God
and man; and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and punishment of
murder on them, and on their seconds also.” 103 Yet it is clear that
95. See id. at 129 (noting that printers risked “a caning or libel suit” for publishing
pamphlets that insulted political elites).
96. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 505–06.
97. See id. at 529–36 (detailing one of the most “infamous” duels in American political
history).
98. See id. at 507 (“In this way, the law replaced the code of honor’s conception of
individual life as entirely public—and personal insults as therefore worthy of public
settlement—with a new idea that public redress ought to be limited to certain types of insult
affecting certain special realms of human activity.”).
99. Id.
100. Frank T. Wheeler, Satisfaction Due a Gentleman: Early Conflict Resolution, 8 J.S.
LEGAL HIST. 1, 2 (2000).
101. See id. at 6–9 (recounting the events leading to the Adams-Richards duel in 1877).
102. See generally Wells, supra note 7.
103. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *199.
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Blackstone strongly sympathized with the desire to vindicate one’s honor
by acting against the person who had transgressed it. Hence, he worried
that prohibitions on dueling demand of gentlemen “a degree of passive
valour [such that] . . . the strongest prohibitions and penalties of the law will
never be entirely effectual to eradicate this unhappy custom.”104
Accordingly, Blackstone thought that:
[A] method [must] be found out of compelling the original aggressor to
make some other satisfaction to the affronted party, which the world shall
esteem equally reputable, as that which is now given at the hazard of the
life and fortune, as well of the person insulted, as of him who hath given
the insult. 105

Likewise, in the 1814 case of Merest v. Harvey, 106 the court of common
pleas upheld the damage award in a trespass case using Blackstone’s
reasoning. “It goes to prevent the practice of duelling,” stated Justice
Heath, “if juries are permitted to punish insult by exemplary damages.” 107
Strikingly, one of America’s most important apologists for dueling in the
nineteenth century took a very similar position. In his influential 1858
how-to manual for duelists, former South Carolina Governor John Lyde
Wilson 108 denied that he was “an advocate of duelling.”109 He wrote:
The indiscriminate and frequent appeal to arms, to settle trivial disputes
and misunderstandings, cannot be too severely censured and
deprecated. . . . But in cases where the laws of the country give no
redress for injuries received, where public opinion not only authorizes,
but enjoins resistance, it [sic] needless and a waste of time to denounce
the practice. 110

Note how Wilson, like Blackstone, links dueling to the absence of
adequate legal redress for wrongs and the social demand that insults to
honor be answered. 111 Both of them, in short, believed that law should
provide redress for affronts to personal honor.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 5 Taunt. 442 (C.P.).
107. Id.; see also Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 957, 1008–15 (2007) (discussing the relationship between injury and insult in early
tort cases involving punitive damages).
108. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 515–19 (discussing Wilson’s background and
influence).
109. JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR; OR RULES FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELLING 4 (1858).
110. Id. at 6.
111. Elsewhere, Wilson defends dueling with Lockean arguments that bear a striking
resemblance to those marshaled by Zipursky and Goldberg in favor of civil recourse theory.
After invoking the classic Lockean argument in favor of revolution, and analogizing the
insulted gentleman to the victim of tyranny, Wilson writes:
How many cases are there, that might be enumerated, where there is no tribunal to
do justice to an oppressed and deeply wronged individual? If he be subjected to a
tame submission to insult and disgrace, where no power can shield him from its
effects, then indeed it would seem, that the first law of nature, self-preservation,
points out the only remedy for his wrongs.
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While the claim that civil litigation is, like the duel, a means of
vindicating one’s honor may seem initially implausible, history suggests
otherwise. This history, of course, does not provide a normative defense of
civil recourse. Nor does it demonstrate that our current law can be seen as
redeeming lost honor. It does, however, suggest that such ideas, far from
being a fanciful analogy to litigation, have long been concretely associated
with it. This in turn suggests the value of further examining these ideas, in
effect providing a prima facie warrant for the more detailed arguments that
follow.
III. A MODERN DEFENSE OF HONOR
Can honor provide a normative justification for civil recourse today?
Initially, an affirmative answer to this question seems unlikely. To modern
ears, invoking honor seems quaint at best. At worse, it has a jingoistic and
aristocratic sound, suggesting the exaltation of violence and abusive,
inegalitarian social relationships. Accordingly, honor finds few defenders
among contemporary scholars. 112 Hopefully the previous section has
established a historical and interpretive connection between the idea of civil
recourse and the vindication of one’s honor. The task of this section is to
persuade the reader that the vindication of personal honor through litigation
is normatively desirable. The task has four parts. First, I must extricate the
idea of honor from unsavory associations with anachronistic, aristocratic
societies. Second, I must provide a normative defense of victims of insults
to honor acting against those that have wronged them. Third, I must
provide reasons why the state should provide a mechanism for vindicating
one’s honor. Finally, I must show how the particular normative defense
that I have offered connects to the structure of private litigation.
A. Honor in a Modern World
The term “honor” has a distinctly anachronistic flavor to it. It calls forth
images of knights errant, duelists, and others inhabiting an atavistic moral
universe that seems far removed from the modern world. Peter Berger
provided an apt summary of this attitude, writing:
Honour occupies about the same place in contemporary usage as chastity.
An individual asserting it hardly invites admiration, and one who claims
to have lost it is an object of amusement rather than sympathy. . . . At
best, honour and chastity are seen as ideological leftovers in the

Id. at 4–5; cf. Goldberg, supra note 30, at 541–44 (noting that under Locke’s theory of
government, individuals give up a portion of their right to self-preservation upon emerging
from the state of nature); Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 735 (stating that Locke
argued for the use of deadly force in only limited circumstances). Note how Wilson links
the legitimacy of dueling to both the absence of a legal redress and to the law of nature, in
particular the right of self-preservation. Cf. LOCKE, supra note 44, at 291–92 (discussing how
the natural right of self-preservation requires that “the Magistrate” provide a means of
redress).
112. Few defenders, but not no defenders. See generally APPIAH, supra note 7; KRAUSE,
supra note 7; WELSH, supra note 7.
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consciousness of obsolete classes, such as military officers or ethnic
grandmothers. 113

The bare fact of anachronism, of course, is not an argument against
honor, unless one subscribes to a kind of chronological snobbery whereby
the present is always presumed to be wiser than the past. Indeed, private
law is itself old fashioned—if not, one hopes, anachronistic—predating
fields such as administrative law, constitutional law, or even criminal law
by many centuries. 114 Anachronism, however, does raise two possible
concerns. The first is that honor is associated with moral ideas that we now
have good reasons for rejecting. The second is that whatever its
justifiability in the past, honor is somehow unfit for modern societies.
According to one influential interpretation, honor was a value of
hierarchical, aristocratic societies, but in the modern world honor has been
transformed into the more democratic idea of dignity. 115 Honor, on this
theory, is associated with one’s status within a social hierarchy in which
institutions provide the primary definition of roles and identities.116 Hence,
for example, the honor of a knight in feudal society was defined in terms of
his position within a social hierarchy. It entitled him to the deference of
social inferiors, while making him honor-bound to show similar deference
to those above him on the social ladder. 117 Closely associated with this
institution- and hierarchy-bound conception of honor is honor’s alleged
failure to differentiate between external status and internal moral worth.118

113. Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour, reprinted in
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149, 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
114. Such anachronism, however, may provide fodder for functionalist interpretations of
private law. While little remarked upon today, for example, Oliver Wendell Holmes offered
a theory of legal anachronism in which rules and institutions developed in the past to serve
now obsolete purposes survive into the present only because they serve current needs quite
different than those that gave them life. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 5–33 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (setting forth Holmes’s theory of legal
development).
115. See CHARLES TAYLOR, The Politics of Recognition, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS
225, 226 (1995) (“As against this [archaic] notion of honor, we have the modern notion of
dignity, now used in a universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent
‘dignity of human beings’ or of citizen dignity.”).
116. See Berger, supra note 113, at 151 (“[H]onour is a direct expression of status, a
source of solidarity among social equals and a demarcation line against social inferiors.”);
Darwall, supra note 7, at 4–5 (“Honor respect . . . mediates and underlies an essentially
hierarchical social order of honor. It recognizes someone []as having a specific social status
that not just anyone can have, and it helps constitute that status in a way that is very different
from the relation between the second-personal respect involved in mutual accountability and
equal authority or dignity.”).
117. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 249 (1983) (“In a hierarchical society like that of feudal Europe, a title is the
name of a rank attached to the name of a person. To call a person by his title is to place him
in the social order and, depending on the place, to honor or dishonor him.”).
118. See Darwall, supra note 7, at 5 (“It is important that honor respect is a kind of
recognition rather than appraisal respect. It consists neither in any form of esteem nor in any
view of someone as worthy of esteem, nor, for that matter, as worthy of honor. As with
recognition respect of any kind, we honor someone by how we conduct ourselves toward
her, by regulating our conduct in certain ways. It is something we broadly do. Honor
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The feudal knight had honor because of his status rather than any particular
quality that he might possess. Such honor as he had in the possession of
some noble character trait—such as courage or strength—lay in its
recognition by others rather than the mere fact of its existence. To be sure,
he could be shamed by his actions but only to the extent that they were
public, holding him up to scorn before others.
Perhaps the chief proponent of this narrative is Charles Taylor. In his
magisterial Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, he
traces what he sees as the evolution of Western moral consciousness from
an external ethic of honor to an internal ethic of dignity. 119 According to
Taylor, the idea of honor is tied to an ethic that places ultimate importance
on the self reflected back by the regard of others. 120 What matters is how
we are thought of, our external reputation and esteem. He then traces the
replacement of this ethic by one that increasingly turns inward, grounding
moral worth not in external regard but rather in a person’s internal
contemplation of himself. 121 He ties this development to the rise of
Cartesian philosophy with its emphasis on the internal intellectual activity
of the knower, as opposed to earlier epistemological systems that
emphasized the intelligibility of the universe. 122
One can see something of the intellectual shift posited by Taylor in the
debates over dueling in antebellum America discussed above. Northern
anti-dueling activists emphasized the importance of inner integrity over
public reputation, arguing that Southern dueling was based on a shallow
concern with the appearance of character as opposed to its reality. 123 In
contrast, antebellum duelists continued to live in a world where there was
no sharp distinction between inner moral worth and external social
regard. 124 Fitting the debate into Taylor’s typology, Northerners were
respect is thus unlike any attitude, like esteem, which we may simply have toward a
person.”).
119. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY (1989); TAYLOR, supra note 115, at 225–56.
120. See TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF, supra note 119, at 3–91 (discussing identity and
the nature of the good).
121. See id. at 111–99 (tracing inwardness of this ethic).
122. See id. at 143–58 (describing the emergence of Cartesian philosophy).
123. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 529 (“Dueling was beginning to lose its usefulness in
the North because it revealed nothing about individuals’ inner character at a time when
northerners were increasingly focused on the role of private morality in a commercial
society.”).
124. LaCroix provided an apt summary of this stance, writing:
[T]hey viewed as completely permeable the boundary between themselves, their
morals, and their society; therefore, one could argue, they did not conceive of it as
a boundary at all. (And further, one could argue, such a boundary did not exist.)
Thus, the question “Do I duel to validate my own conception of myself as a
gentleman or to achieve external validation from those around me when assembled
in their corporate form as ‘society’?” would have been unthinkable to the earlynineteenth-century dueling gentleman because the order of his universe hinged on
the belief that these two forms of validation were identical, that self-conception as
a gentleman was worthless without providing society with the opportunity to judge
for itself.
Id. at 513–14.
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shifting toward the modern notion of human dignity, while Southerners
continued to be motivated by an older ethic of honor.
If the dominant narrative about honor is correct, then we seem to have
good reasons for rejecting it. Few today are willing to defend the kind of
hierarchical and aristocratic society that would allow some to maintain their
honor by demanding deference from social inferiors on the basis of their
office or status. Rather, we are much more likely to subscribe to a universal
ideal of human dignity. Dignity in this egalitarian and democratic sense,
however, is not something that one acquires by either great deeds or social
status. Rather, it is something that everyone possesses through the mere
fact of being human. 125 For example, it is not the sort of thing that one can
lose, even when one commits atrocious crimes. 126
Likewise, the concept of honor, with its emphasis on public regard,
seems dangerously disconnected from real moral worth. As Falstaff
declares before the climactic battle in Henry IV, Part 1:
Well, ‘tis no matter; honor pricks me on. Yea, but how if honor prick me
off when I come on? How then? Can honor set to a leg? No. Or an arm?
No . . . What is honor? A word. . . . Therefore I’ll none of it. Honor is a
mere scutcheon; and so ends my catechism. 127

For Falstaff, honor may cause one to risk life and limb but it is ultimately
without substance. It is “a mere scutcheon”—an outward sign—with no
real worth. Indeed, to the extent that it calls forth unjustified acts of
violence or self-immolation, it is positively pernicious. As a more modern
poet bleakly wrote of the soldiers of the Great War, “They went arrayed in
honour. But they died . . . .” 128 On this view, the concept of honor is
dangerous precisely because it might motivate people to acts of great selfsacrifice or violence on the basis of mere public esteem. In its most
grotesque form, such an emphasis on reputation as the arbiter of moral
worth could hold up manifestly wicked acts such as racist lynchings as
honorable endeavors. 129

125. See Darwall, supra note 7, at 6 (“When we think that even scoundrels have a dignity
that entitles them to respectful forms of treatment (say, in holding them accountable), we
clearly have something other than esteem in mind. The idea is not that personhood is
somehow an admirable quality: [w]hat is in play here is not appraisal but recognition.”).
126. As Martha Nussbaum writes, “Even where malefactors are concerned . . . while
punishments must be meted out for reasons including both the deterrent and the retributive, a
concern with the dignity of the offender should always be solidly built into the system of
punishment . . . .” MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND
THE LAW 174–75 (2004).
127. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF HENRY THE FOURTH act 5, sc. 1, lines
125–41 (Bertrand Evans, ed. 1963). It is worth noting that Falstaff speaks in prose, an
unheroic idiom but one that conveys a certain realism that iambic pentameter lacks.
128. SIEGFRIED SASSOON, Banishment, in COUNTER-ATTACK AND OTHER POEMS 44, 44
(1918).
129. See WYATT-BROWN, supra note 7, at 402 (“Lynch law, vigilantism, and charivaris
were the ultimate expressions of community will. They established the coercive lines
between acceptable and unacceptable behavior for all members of the Southern social
order.”).

2011]

THE HONOR OF PRIVATE LAW

53

There are reasons to believe, however, that this critique of honor is
overstated. Honor need not be associated exclusively with inegalitarian
societies. The anthropologist Frank Stewart has usefully distinguished
between what he calls vertical honor and horizontal honor.130 Vertical
honor refers to the status and public esteem that one gains by virtue of one’s
place in a social hierarchy from those below him on the social ladder. 131
Horizontal honor consists of the respect that one gets from a group of peers,
what Stewart calls the “honor group.” 132 Something like this distinction
runs through the writing of the classical common law theorists of the
sixteenth century. 133 Coke speaks of how the law provides redress for
“injury[] and wrong” to a subject’s “honor, and estimation.”134 However,
in most of the cases where Coke or other classical common law writers such
as Hale or Selden speak of honor, they are talking about the honor
associated with feudal tenures and offices. 135 When Coke and Blackstone
insist that “[t]he king is likewise the fountain of honour,” 136 they are
referring to this vertical notion of honor. Strikingly, however, they seldom
connect this idea of honor within an aristocratic hierarchy to the honor
vindicated by civil redress through the courts. Rather, this second form of
honor is something at least potentially possessed by all subjects and
protected by the law. In other words, the honor vindicated by the common
law right of redress was a horizontal rather than vertical form of honor.
While notions of vertical honor may be out of place in a modern
democracy, there is nothing inegalitarian about retaining the respect of
one’s peers. Indeed, one might think of citizenship in a modern republic as
itself a kind of honor group, in which one claims the right to be respected
by a group of equals. 137 On this view, to be dishonored is to be placed
outside the community of equals. It is to not be accorded that respect to
which membership in the political community makes one entitled. Such a
notion of honor is congruent with widely held notions of equal citizenship
and equal claims to respect and concern from the political community. To
be sure, it would be a mistake to reduce the idea of honor to a Kantian
notion of respect, but it would also be a mistake to suppose that the concept
of honor only makes sense within hierarchical, aristocratic societies.
Likewise, there are reasons for believing that any shift from honor to
dignity has not entirely extirpated the earlier idea from modern society.
First, the “old” notion of honor was never purely a matter of public esteem.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See STEWART, supra note 7, at 54–63.
See id. at 59.
See id. at 54 (describing the context of this “honor right”).
See generally Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2
OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155, 165 (2002) (discussing the legal thought of Coke,
Hale, Selden and other sixteenth-century common law theorists); Gerald J. Postema,
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 OXFORD UNIV. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 1,
22–27 (2003) (same).
134. 2 COKE, supra note 72, at 872–73.
135. See, e.g., 1 COKE, supra note 72, at 56.
136. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *271.
137. See WELSH, supra note 7, at 9–21 (building off similar findings from anthropology
and psychology).
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In discussing the notion of honor, Aristotle was clear that what matters is
not simply the good opinion of others, but rather the good opinion of the
virtuous. 138 To be honorable was not simply a matter of being famous but
of having the set of excellences—virtues—that entitled one to a good
reputation. The mere calumnies of those known to be without virtue are no
dishonor. Similarly, the inward morality that Taylor documents has found
it remarkably difficult to do without the idea of an observer, if only a
hypothetical one. This can be seen clearly, for example, in the moral
philosophy of Adam Smith, which is organized around the idea of an
impartial spectator whose judgments seem remarkably similar to the good
reputation among virtuous men espoused by Aristotle.139
Furthermore, honor continues to be a part of our conceptual apparatus,
even though we frequently disguise the fact with democratic sounding
language. This can be seen most clearly in our use of the word “dignity”
itself. When Taylor and those subscribing to his narrative about the history
of honor use the term, it refers to some intrinsic value that all human beings
have. Dignity is thus closely tied to egalitarian ideas of equal worth and
liberal conceptions of human beings as the holders of inalienable rights.
We might, for example, say that slavery is an affront to the idea of human
dignity. This does not imply that a slave lacks dignity. Indeed, it is
precisely the fact that the slave is endowed with human dignity regardless
of his social status that makes slavery grotesque. It is not that enslavement
takes away one’s dignity but rather that it refuses to acknowledge such
dignity. Even slaves have human dignity. This is precisely what gives the
idea its liberal and egalitarian traction.
On the other hand, we have another way of using the term dignity. We
might say of an older man of experience and wisdom that he behaves with
great dignity. There are a number of things to notice about this usage of the
term. First, it is egalitarian. The older man’s dignity is not a matter of
socioeconomic class. On the other hand, the dignity we are talking about is
not universal. Some people are not dignified. Civil rights marchers had
dignity. Those screaming vile epithets at them were without dignity.
Second, dignity in this sense is something that can be lost as opposed to
merely not being recognized. When a mugger pushes a dignified matron
into the mud, she is humiliated. Her dignity is taken away. This is true
even if we do not understand her moral worth as being diminished and even
if we understand that dignity of a sort can be maintained in the midst of
victimization. The evil of the mugger’s shove lies not simply in his refusal
138. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 25, bk. VIII, ch. 8, at 267 (“On the other hand, those who
desire the honour or respect of good men and men who know, are anxious to confirm their
own opinion of themselves; they rejoice, therefore, in the assurance of their worth which
they gain from confidence in the judgment of those who declare it.”).
139. See, e.g., ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 50–51 (Arlington
House, 1969) (1759) (comparing our self-interested assessment of right conduct with “the
cool and impartial spectator”); see also WELSH, supra note 7, at 168–82 (discussing the role
of honor in Adam Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator); cf. Stephen Darwall, Smith’s
Ambivalence About Honour, 5 ADAM SMITH REV. 106 (2010) (discussing Adam Smith’s
criticisms of the ethic of honor).
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to recognize the inherent human dignity of the old woman. It also lies in
the fact that it takes away the more particularistic dignity she had before the
shove. Likewise, dignity may be lost through one’s own actions. Bill
Clinton lost dignity through his sexual peccadilloes in the Oval Office.140
When he played Moses before Pharaoh in Cecil B. DeMille’s The Ten
Commandments, Charlton Heston acted with dignity; when he histrionically
waved aloft a Kentucky rifle at an NRA rally and made pledges about
prying it loose from his cold, dead hands he was not acting with dignity. 141
The dignity discussed in these examples may be related to the dignity of
universal human worth, but it is clearly not the same thing. It does not
reside equally in all people. It is not an inherent feature of humanity. It can
be lost or diminished through either one’s own actions or through the
actions of others. Sharon Krause has observed, “When the word dignity is
used in this way it is a democratic euphemism for honor, because it is tied
to exceptional action, high achievement, and extraordinary character.”142
While her emphasis on honor as a basis for action leads her to overstate the
extent to which dignity is tied to noteworthy acts, she is surely right that the
idea of honor continues to exist within our moral discourse, albeit cloaked
in democratic euphemism.
B. Acting to Vindicate One’s Honor
An honor-based defense of civil recourse, however, requires more than
simply the rehabilitation of the idea of honor for a modern, democratic
society. It must also explain why a victim acting against a wrongdoer that
has dishonored him or her is normatively attractive. In A Theory of Justice,
Rawls argues that the idea of self-respect is a key aspect of living a good
life. “Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life,” he
writes, “as the sense that one’s plan is worth carrying out.” 143 Elsewhere,
he elucidates this idea:
[S]elf-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within
one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions. When we feel that our plans are
of little value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in
their execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue
our endeavors. It is clear then why self-respect is a primary good.
Without it nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value
for us, we lack the will to strive for them. 144

140. The case of Bill Clinton’s loss of dignity is complicated in part because in his case,
part of the dignity at stake was tied to an office. Hence, one can speak of him diminishing
the “dignity of the Presidency.” Clinton, however, did more than simply tarnish the dignity
of his office. He also tarnished his own personal dignity. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT,
THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE: BILL CLINTON AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS (1998);
Editorial, Date with Destiny, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Aug. 16, 1998, at J2.
141. Compare THE TEN COMMANDMENTS (Paramount Pictures 1956), with Osha Gray
Davidson, All Fired Up: The NRA Makes a Lot of Noise, but That Doesn’t Help the Gun
Owners of America, WASH. POST, June 4, 2000, at B1.
142. See KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 16.
143. RAWLS, supra note 26, at 155.
144. Id. at 386.

56

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Rawls acknowledges that self-respect is tied to the respect of others.145
Our self-respect is a function, in part, of others’ acknowledgment that we
are entitled to respect. The implications that he draws from this fact,
however, are couched entirely in the idiom of public law. He speaks in
terms of duties of respect toward others, and of the need for beneficent
social planners in the original position to ensure a just distribution of selfrespect through the principles of distributive justice that Rawls advances. 146
One can see honor in this discussion clothed in the kind of democratic
euphemism discussed above. Self-respect is esteem toward one’s own life,
an esteem bolstered by the esteem of others. This is honor. What is
missing from Rawls’s discussion is an appreciation for the value of agency,
in particular, self-assertion in the face of attacks on one’s self-respect. To
be sure, Rawls sees self-respect as a wellspring for action—“confidence in
one’s ability . . . to fulfill one’s intentions” 147—but he sees little role for
agency in maintaining one’s self-respect. Rather, Rawls conceptualizes it
as something that one is gifted by the basic structure of society, a form of
entitlement to be distributed like welfare payments or voting rights.148
Self-respect, however, cannot simply be distributed by a third-party. In
this Homer was a more acute student of the human condition than Rawls.
In The Iliad, honor is not ultimately dispensed by the gods, but is gained by
heroic actions. “Fight like men, my friends,” urges Patroclus, “Now we
must win high honor for Peleus’ royal son . . . .” 149 It is deeds that win the
honor, even honor for another. Obviously, the blood-thirsty agency exalted
by Homer cannot be justified, but he is right to focus on the role of human
action in maintaining self-respect. “By disconnecting abilities from selfesteem,” writes one critic, “Rawls makes self-confidence into an assertion
rather than an achievement.” 150
Humiliation poses a particular threat to self-respect. In this context
humiliation is more than simply embarrassment. It is something that one
person does to another person. When a person insults another, that person
denies that the insulted party is entitled to respect, placing them in a
subordinate status to the person offering the insult. A person vindicates her
honor by acting against the person that offered the insult and forcing the
insulting party to respond in a way that acknowledges the equality of the
insulted party, in effect enacting her entitlement to be treated with respect,
her honor. The logic of dueling illustrates how this is so.

145. See id. at 155–56 (“Now our self-respect normally depends upon the respect of
others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are respected by them, it is difficult if not
impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing.”).
146. See id. at 155–60 (discussing the role of self-respect in the deliberations of agents in
the original position).
147. See id. at 386.
148. See KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 18 (“Thus self-esteem is a good to be distributed,
according to Rawls, and in a just society it will be distributed equally.”).
149. HOMER, THE ILIAD 421 (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1990).
150. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 19.
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During its heyday, dueling was condemned as an immoral and irrational
practice, and historians have generally echoed this judgment. 151 Dueling
was not without its own logic, however. The gentleman who challenged
another gentleman to a duel did a number of things. 152 First, he
demonstrated not only bravery but also the high value that he placed on his
own honor. 153 He showed the world that he was willing to risk death rather
than suffer an insult. Second, he forced his rival to address him as an
equal. 154 By attacking him physically—albeit via the highly stylized rules
of the code duello—a duelist forced his opponent quite literally to
acknowledge him as an adversary on equal terms. It was not violence per
se that achieved this equality. 155 Rather, it was the way in which the
stylized violence of dueling created a confrontation where the insulting
party had to meet the insulted party on equal terms. 156
Only social equals could challenge one another to duels. 157 A gentleman
would never challenge a tradesman to a duel or vice versa. More
importantly, the practice of the duel eliminated distinctions between
gentlemen. 158 For example, in 1829, the Duke of Wellington fought a duel
with the Earl of Winchilsea. 159 The duel came at the height of the debate
over Catholic emancipation, and Winchilsea had published a pamphlet
accusing Wellington of dishonest political tactics.160 Despite the fact that
both men had noble titles, they actually occupied quite different social
positions. 161 Wellington was the hero of Waterloo and the Peninsular
campaigns of the Napoleonic wars. 162 He was also Prime Minister. 163 He
thus occupied the apogee of political life as both the first soldier and
leading statesman of the realm. 164 Winchilsea, in contrast, was a
comparative nobody, a political crank on the fringe of the aristocracy.165
Yet on the dueling field both men were equals, gentlemen defending their
honor without any formal recognition of the gulf in prestige that separated
Wellington from Winchilsea. 166
151. See, e.g., APPIAH, supra note 7, at 31–37 (condemning dueling as immoral and
irrational).
152. See id. at 19–22; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512.
153. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 13; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
154. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
155. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 25; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
156. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 19; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
157. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
158. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 15–16; LaCroix, supra note 7, at 512–14.
159. See APPIAH, supra note 7, at 3–6 (discussing lead-up to the duel).
160. Id. at 8 (“He alleged that the king’s first minister had dissembled in offering his
financial support for the creation of King’s College London as an Anglican institution to
counterbalance the recent secular foundation of London University.”).
161. Id. at 8–9 (noting the different social positions of the two men).
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 3–4.
165. Id. at 9 (describing the Earl as “a peer of no personal importance, but a stalwart
upholder of Church and State”) (internal citation omitted).
166. Id. at 15 (“Wellington treated Winchilsea as a gentleman in challenging him to a
duel.”).
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The duel can be usefully contrasted here to the practice of caning, a form
of stylized violence that reinforced contempt rather than equality. 167 When
a social inferior insulted a gentleman’s honor, there was never any question
of fighting a duel. Such disputes about vertical honor could either be
resolved via a suit for libel or slander, or more directly by a private
beating. 168 Such a beating, while violent, was not the equivalent of a duel.
A gentleman need not be directly involved and could send his servants to
perform the deed. 169 Indeed, part of the abandonment of the duel in the
antebellum North can be attributed to the way that litigation came to be
seen as more like dueling and less like caning. As Northern society became
more egalitarian, the importance of distinctions between gentlemen and
common people receded.170 This did not mean that the concept of honor
lost its meaning, only that it no longer took its meaning from a hierarchical
social structure. 171 Instead, all free citizens came to be seen as in some
sense a peer group. Rather than adopting the view that this meant that
everyone should duel with everyone, however, antebellum Northerners
came to see litigation as a sufficient means of redeeming one’s honor even
with peers.
Obviously, the stylized attempted murder of the duel cannot be morally
justified. Its underlying logic, however, illuminates why acting against
someone to vindicate one’s honor is normatively defensible. An attack
invites a response in kind from the person being attacked. This reflexive
response creates a situation of acknowledged equality between the parties at
the moment of confrontation, even if one party is ultimately stronger than
the other or if the means of attack and defense are constrained. In his short
story His Private Honour, Rudyard Kipling illustrates the way in which a
fair fight can establish equality and respect across social castes and
hierarchies. 172 In the story, a young lieutenant in the British Army
humiliates a grizzled old soldier. 173 The difference in military ranks
reinforced the social gulf between the upper class, educated lieutenant and

167. See FREEMAN, supra note 7, at 172.
168. See id. at 174 (discussing an incident between Representatives Lyon and Griswold
that ended in a fracas on the House floor); LaCroix, supra note 7, at 515 (“Most duels arose
out of a verbal slight in which one gentleman called into question the character of another by
using certain coded words such as ‘puppy,’ ‘liar, poltroon, [or] coward.’” (citing Joanne B.
Freeman, Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53 WM. & MARY Q.
289, 299 (1996); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 7, at 360)).
169. See FREEMAN, supra note 7, at 172 (noting the practice of “caning”); LaCroix, supra
note 7, at 512–14 (describing the code of honor).
170. See LaCroix, supra note 7, at 545–51 (noting the decline of dueling in the North).
171. See id. at 568 (“Imploring the duelist to abandon the quest to throw the correct
shadow onto the screen of his society and back onto himself, opponents of dueling such as
Beecher, Dwight, and Colton attempted to invert the dynamic of honor so that the right to
call oneself a gentleman would derive from internal character rather than external reputation,
from virtue rather than its hollow reflection.”).
172. RUDYARD KIPLING, His Private Honour, in MANY INVENTIONS 151, 151–80 (1926).
173. The lieutenant, Ouless, struck the soldier, Ortheris, with a riding cane during a drill.
Id. at 163–64.
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the barely literate cockney veteran.174 The young lieutenant struggles with
how to restore the soldier’s honor in a world where fixed hierarchies of rank
and status seem to preclude the two men ever meeting as equals.175 Finally,
the two men agree to meet in a fair fight.176 In the melee of punches
thrown and dodged, the lieutenant is shorn of the protections of hierarchy
and is literally forced to meet the wronged man on equal terms. 177
It goes without saying, of course, that a confrontation to vindicate one’s
lost honor necessarily involves the danger of violence and arbitrary
outcomes based on the strength of the parties rather than the merits of their
respective moral claims against one another. Indeed, the danger of
unregulated private recourse is at the heart of the civil recourse theory to
which this Article seeks to contribute.178 The manifest dangers of private
retaliation, however, should not blind us to the way in which acting against
someone in a way that demands a defensive response establishes an equality
that gives the lie to the inequality inherent in the original insult. Notice
also, that this equality-in-confrontation cannot be established through a
third party punishing the offender. Indeed, the appeal to the power of a
third party can be a declaration of powerlessness that reinforces rather than
challenges the original insult. Likewise, an “unfair fight” such as an
ambush or a gang of servants sent to cane an uppity social inferior cannot
perform this task. Rather, what is needed is a situation in which the
insulted party strikes out against the insulting party in a way that demands a
response predicated on the equality and fairness of the confrontation. A fair
fight after an insult re-establishes respect and honor.
C. Reasons for the State to Provide Recourse
A defense of civil recourse, however, must also explain why the state has
good reasons to empower plaintiffs to act against defendants who have
wronged them. Another way of posing the same problem is to imagine a
world in which the private law did not exist and there was no way for
victims of wrongs to act against those that have wronged them. This is, in
effect, the strategy adopted by Goldberg and Zipursky. 179 They claim that
in such a world the state would be failing to meet its duties under a Lockean
social contract. By suppressing private violence, the law could deprive
persons of their due, argue Goldberg and Zipursky, because man has, in the
words of Locke, “besides the right of punishment common to him with
other Men, a particular Right to seek Reparation from him that has done

174. Id. at 164 (“After seven years’ service and three medals, he had been struck by a boy
younger than himself!”).
175. Id. at 166–67.
176. Ouless invited Ortheris to go shooting with him and when they were away from the
camp, the two men agreed to fight. Id. at 176–78.
177. Id. at 178 (“I got ‘im one on the nose that painted ‘is little aristocratic white shirt for
‘im.”).
178. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 30, at 734–36 (discussing the civility of
civil recourse theory).
179. See Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 640–42.
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it.” 180 To avoid this injustice, the state has a duty to provide its citizens
with a system of private law. 181 We can adopt a similar strategy for
thinking about the vindication of one’s honor. What evil would result were
it impossible for those who are humiliated to act against those that have
dishonored them?
Consider an example from Charles Dickens’s novel A Tale of Two
Cities. 182 In the book, the Marquis Evremonde, driving his carriage
recklessly through the streets of Paris, kills the young son of a humble sans
culotte named Gaspard.183 Evremonde throws a coin at the man to
compensate him for his loss, but only after berating him for not taking
better care of his children and for endangering Evremonde’s horses. 184 The
grief stricken man grovels in the pavement before the Marquis, and the
thoroughly cowed pre-revolutionary crowd of onlookers does nothing. 185
As Evremonde drives away, however, someone throws the coin back into
his carriage in an act of anonymous defiance. 186 Gaspard, the father of the
dead boy, subsequently murders the Marquis. 187
In a sense, the story of Gaspard and the Marquis Evremonde is the story
of a tort. There is negligence and wrongful death. Dickens has constructed
his story so as to offer moral condemnation on several different levels. At
the outset, we are invited to loathe the Marquis Evremonde. He is selfish,
thoughtless of others, and cruel. Interestingly, his villainy is not lessened
by his nod toward the duty of corrective justice. After all, he does throw a
coin to Gaspard. There are two things that are worth noting about the
tossed coin. First, the Marquis acted on the duty of corrective justice
without any agency on Gaspard’s part. Indeed, throughout the encounter
Gaspard remained prostrate. Second, while the amount that the Marquis
tendered to the grieving father may have been too little—and therefore his
fulfillment of the duty of corrective justice a sham—this is not why the
incident of the coin serves to further excite the disgust of the reader. In part
this may simply be because the loss of a child to a loving father can never
be compensated for, and the offer of so trifling an amount was an insult to
the memory of Gaspard’s son. Imagine, however, that rather than throwing
a coin into the mud, the Marquis dropped a chest containing more wealth
than the impoverished Gaspard or his son would have realized in a lifetime
of toil. Such an act would have been as complete a discharge of the duty of
corrective justice as would be possible under the circumstances, but still it
would arouse the reader’s ire against Evremonde. There is some sin beyond
inadequate compensation that the Marquis has committed with his coin. It
is a gesture of contempt.

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

LOCKE, supra note 44, at 291.
Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, supra note 30, at 642.
CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES (Modern Library ed. 1996) (1859).
Id. at 138–40.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 163.
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It is important to see, however, that Dickens is not simply condemning
the villainy of the Marquis Evremonde in this story. Beyond his fictional
Marquis, Dickens is condemning the ancien regime in France. Lest readers
misunderstand the object of his critique, Dickens wrote in his Preface to the
novel:
Whenever any reference (however slight) is made here to the condition of
the French people before or during the Revolution, it is truly made, on the
faith of the most trustworthy witnesses. It has been one of my hopes to
add something to the popular and picturesque means of understanding that
terrible time . . . . 188

Dickens condemns the ancien regime by showing the way in which it
humiliated ordinary people. This evil did not lie in the fact that the Marquis
was a villain. Villains exist in every society. Rather, the ancien regime
humiliated Gaspard by denying him any agency against his wrongdoer.
Dickens’s critique of the ancien regime lay in the situation in which it
placed Gaspard. He had no means of seeking redress against the Marquis.
He had no legal rights against the Marquis. He could not even challenge
him to a duel. The lack of recourse stripped Gaspard of any ability to
respond to the way in which the Marquis’s actions asserted the absence of
any entitlement to respect on his part. In his helplessness Gaspard was in
effect made complicit in his own humiliation. Reduced to groveling
silently in the street, Gaspard’s inability to respond reasserted the Marquis’s
insult to him and his son. In this sense the evil that he suffered at the hands
of the ancien regime in his humiliation is akin to the evil created in a case of
compelled speech. In this case, he was effectively kept from denying his
own lack of honor and coerced to in effect reassert the insult against
himself. The murder Gaspard commits thus becomes more than simply an
act of revenge. It is the means by which he asserts his entitlement to
respect—his honor—in the face of a system that denies it.
Of course, the artistry of Dickens’s tale lies in part in its multiplicity.
One cannot reduce Gaspard’s action to the simple vindication of honor. He
is also acting out of revenge and grief at the loss of his son. Within the
narrative economy of Dickens’s treatment of the ancien regime, however,
the murder of the Marquis serves to illuminate the humiliation that it visited
upon its citizens. Tellingly, Gaspard is executed in the novel, the only
appearance of the law in the story serving as a reminder of how it barred all
avenues of action against the Marquis.189 In short, the Marquis treats
Gaspard and his loved ones with contempt, humiliating them, and the evil
of the ancien regime lies in part in the way in which it deprives Gaspard of
any means of vindicating his honor against this humiliation.
188. Id. at ix. Dickens went on to write, “though no one can hope to add anything to the
philosophy of Mr. Carlyle’s wonderful book.” Id. Modern historians have been less
enamored of Carlyle’s vision of a wholly prostrate and tyrannized French population under
the ancien regime than was Dickens. See SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS: A CHRONICLE OF THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION 183–99 (1989) (discussing liberal legal reforms in the decades before
the Revolution).
189. See DICKENS, supra note 182, at 212–18.
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To see how civil recourse responds to the evil of dishonor, consider
another, less enduring work of fiction, John Grisham’s novel The
Rainmaker. 190 The story revolves around a recent law school graduate who
is left to set up solo practice with a single client, the family of a young man
dying of leukemia whose health insurance company wrongly cut off his
medical care. The boy dies, and the young lawyer pursues a wrongful death
action against the insurance company. The drama of the book centers on
the David and Goliath struggle of the poor family and their neophyte lawyer
against a powerful company that believes it can treat the weak defendants
with contempt. A key piece of evidence in the trial is a letter sent by the
company to the mother denying one of her many appeals for payment under
the policy. In the letter, the company’s claims officer writes that given her
repeated unsuccessful importuning she must be “stupid, stupid, stupid.”191
To be sure, Grisham’s novel is a contrived morality tale, but it is
precisely in the contrived moral action of the story that its theoretical
interest lies. It reveals an important aspect of what is at stake in civil
litigation. The evil being addressed is more than simply the loss suffered
by the plaintiff. It is the way in which the defendant’s conduct treats the
plaintiff with contempt. Grisham’s use of the insulting letter from the
company is a ploy to dramatize this. In one of the climactic scenes of the
novel, the mother of the dead boy is cross-examined by the insurance
company’s lawyer. “What’re you going to do with the money if the jury
gives you ten million dollars?” he asks. “Give it to the American Leukemia
Society,” she responds. “Every penny. I don’t want a dime of your stinkin’
money.” 192 What matters about this scene is not its realism but rather the
fact that it has a conceptual integrity. Her response makes moral sense.
Notice, it makes no dramatic sense to see her as pursuing optimal levels of
investment in avoiding breach of contract. Likewise, her refusal of the
money disclaims the demands of corrective justice. She is not seeking
compensation for her loss. Rather, by acting against the company she is no
longer forced to be complicit in her own humiliation. She is not Gaspard
groveling in the street. By acting against the company she forces it to treat
her as an equal, if only as an adversary within the contrived confrontation of
the courtroom. In short, she vindicates her honor.
It is important to understand that the same effect could not be achieved if
the insurance company were simply prosecuted for fraud or some other
crime. By suing the company, by standing up to it, the mother transformed
herself from a passive victim into an agent, an equal who could demand and
receive respect. Seeing criminal sanctions as sufficient to rectify the evil of
the situation falls into the Rawlsian trap of seeing self-respect as something
that can be dispensed by a beneficent state. Likewise, it is possible to
imagine an alternative plot line in A Tale of Two Cities in which the
190. JOHN GRISHAM, THE RAINMAKER (1995).
191. Id. at 16 (“Dear Mrs. Black: On seven prior occasions this company has denied your
claim in writing. We now deny it for the eighth and final time. You must be stupid, stupid,
stupid!”).
192. See id. at 342.
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Marquis Evremonde was punished by a virtuous king. In such a story we
might feel that Evremonde had received justice, but it would also reinforce
Gaspard’s humiliation rather than allow him to redeem it. There is a
difference between being rescued or defended, and achieving self-respect
by redeeming one’s honor. Civil recourse allows for the regaining of honor
in the face of its loss by giving the victim a means of acting against a
wrongdoer.
Civil recourse does not guarantee anyone’s honor or self-respect. Such is
beyond the ability of law to guarantee. Rather, it provides a means by
which agency can be exercised in the assertion and defense of one’s honor.
Agency thus serves to mediate differences of dignity and honor. As
discussed above, not everyone possesses honor in the same degree.
Suppose a victim of a civil wrong does not wish to assert him or herself
against the tortfeasor or contract breaker. The victim may hold their honor
cheap. The law allows people to make that choice. It does not punish
affronts to honor. Likewise, suppose that a person without apparent dignity
decides to sue in the face of an insult. Imagine a clown, who in the course
of his slapstick normally submits to good natured horseplay from the
audience. The clown is the opposite of the dignified matron imagined
above, a person without apparent honor. The clown may nevertheless be
allowed to sue in battery against the person who unjustifiably shoves him
should he choose to do so. At that moment, the clown may be without
dignity, but this is not a defense for the tortfeasor. By empowering the
clown to act, the law not only provides him with the means of vindicating
honor that already exists, but also provides him—and all other plaintiffs—a
tool with which to construct and defend it.193
D. Civil Recourse and Our Private Law
Finally, a defense of civil recourse requires more than showing that the
state has reasons for providing victims with a means of acting against those
who have dishonored them. It must also show that the actual institutions of
our private law can be plausibly understood in such terms. One might
believe that the state should provide a means for victims to vindicate their
honor but deny that this is what litigation actually does or that such
concerns can be connected to the substantive law of torts and contracts.
1. Litigation
As discussed above, allowing civil recourse does not guarantee anyone’s
honor. Rather it gives plaintiffs one tool with which to defend or establish
their honor. The limited role of recourse in the struggle for honor accounts
in part for the agonistic experience of litigation. Suing someone is more
193. Cf. KRAUSE, supra note 7, at 19 (“Self-respect, which is a necessary condition of
agency, cannot be guaranteed without undercutting agency. We must have enough selfrespect to have the desire for self-respect, but not so much that we no longer need to reach
for it. Rawls means to support agency by democratizing self-respect in the form of equal
‘self-esteem,’ but in fact he undercuts agency.”).
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than simply a petition for redress. It is an act of aggression by the plaintiff
against the wrongdoer. Likewise, the process of litigation is a battle and a
struggle. Understandably, this agonistic aspect of litigation is frequently
deplored. 194 Americans, we are told, are too litigious and quarrelsome.195
There is no doubt some truth to these claims, but in this sense litigationhappy Americans are like eighteenth-century gentlemen touchy about their
dignity and eager for a duel, or like Homeric heroes, willing to incur great
costs to vindicate their slighted honor. The argument offered here does not
deny that litigation has costs. Rather, it asserts that the agonistic struggle of
private law is not simply a cost. By empowering victims to act, civil
recourse creates the struggle that is itself a process of giving citizens a way
of vindicating their honor and asserting the bases of their self-respect in the
face of attack.
The vindication of wronged honor also fits nicely with the adversary
system. Generally speaking, the procedural rules that seek to ensure the
fairness of the adversary process are justified on one of two grounds. First,
these rules can be seen as promoting better deliberation by judicial decision
makers. 196 The idea is that the contending arguments of litigants are the
best way of getting at the truth, which will emerge from the competition of
the parties. Second, we might justify these rules as increasing the
legitimacy of outcomes. 197 Litigants are more likely to defer to the final
decision of the court and regard it as justified if the decision emerges from a
process in which they have been given an opportunity to present their
arguments. The vindication of wronged honor suggests a third option.
Rather than acting as an epistemic aid to decision makers or a prop to their
legitimacy, the adversary system may be seen as an end in itself. The
purpose of the adversary system is to provide a forum for a fair fight
between the plaintiff and the defendant, and it is in the very process of this
struggle that the plaintiff’s honor is vindicated.
2. Tort Law
The claims of honor are strongest in the case of intentional torts,
particularly those that are aimed directly at a subject’s standing before
others, such as the torts of libel or defamation. Such actions arise out of
situations in which the tortfeasor has deliberately treated the victim as an
object that he can harm with impunity. On the other hand, most of tort
litigation does not consist of such intentional torts. 198 Rather, the vast
194. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, LIFE WITHOUT LAWYERS: LIBERATING AMERICANS FROM
TOO MUCH LAW 68–92 (2009).
195. Id. (decrying the rise of frivolous lawsuits).
196. See, e.g., Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance,
37 IND. L. REV. 65, 127 (2003) (“An adversarial process will improve deliberation by
expanding the depth and breadth of the issues brought before the court.”).
197. See, e.g., Elizabeth Mertz, Inside the Law School Classroom: Toward a New Legal
Realist Pedagogy, 60 VAND. L. REV. 483, 501 (2007) (“Overall, the U.S. legal system relies
on an adversarial process—a clash of opposing discursive positions—for its legitimacy.”).
198. See generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
REV. 1093 (1996).
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majority of tort actions arise under the doctrine of negligence.199
Negligence need not require any deliberate insult to the victim. 200 Indeed,
in many negligence suits the tortfeasor may be subjectively unaware of the
victim. In these cases the claim that tort law serves to vindicate the
wronged honor of the plaintiff seems weak. Likewise, many torts involve
strict liability where it is not even necessary to demonstrate that the
defendant failed to use reasonable care.201 In such situations it seems even
more tenuous to regard litigation as vindicating insulted honor. There is
nevertheless evidence that both negligence and some forms of strict liability
fit within the argument put forward in this Article.
While negligence may not involve deliberate wrongdoing toward the
plaintiff, conceptualizing the wrong suffered in terms of insult is not
difficult. Care is a form of respect. For example, among the Bedouin,
treating a guest with honor is tied up in caring for a guest’s needs. 202
Honor requires that one consider and direct attention toward the person
bearing that honor. This is the opposite of a negligent action. Someone
who is negligent in effect fails to direct care toward a person deserving of
such care. Rather, the negligent person ignores her victim or fails to give
him the level of attention to which he is entitled. To commit such an action
can send a powerful message of indifference and even contempt. In this
sense, negligence is insulting.
Medical malpractice, one of the most commonly litigated species of tort,
illustrates this point.203 When hospitals negligently harm a patient, lawyers
will often counsel the hospital to avoid any admission of wrongdoing to the
harmed party. 204 The rationale for such an approach is simple enough to
see: such admissions could later be used against the hospital in
litigation. 205 There is evidence to suggest, however, that in many cases a
simple apology by the hospital mollifies the anger of victims, leading to
easier settlements and less litigation. 206 Such a result, however, makes little
sense from either an economic or corrective justice perspective. The
economic account of tort law suggests that plaintiffs should use the
admission inherent in an apology to maximize their return in litigation.
Corrective justice theories, in turn, suggest that apologies are irrelevant to
199. Id. at 1099–1108 (describing the dispute pyramid, a visualization tool for
understanding the tort litigation system).
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (listing elements of negligence
tort).
201. See id. § 519 (describing the strict liability standard).
202. See STEWART, supra note 7, at 86–88 (explaining Bedouin honor rules).
203. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Contracting over Liability: Medical Malpractice and the
Cost of Choice, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 957 (2010) (providing recent statistics on malpractice
cases).
204. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Advising Clients to Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009,
1011 (1999) (describing medical malpractice litigation strategy).
205. Id.
206. See Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights
Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1271 (2006) (noting a study of plaintiffs in medical
malpractice that showed that “37% wouldn’t have filed suit had the doctor fully explained
and offered an apology to begin with”).
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the rights and duties of the parties. The victim has still suffered a loss at the
defendant’s hands. On the other hand, if part of what motivates tort
litigation is the logic of Gaspard and The Rainmaker—the desire to
vindicate the insult suffered at the hands of the tortfeasor—then the power
of apologies makes sense. Apologies do nothing to create efficient levels of
investment in precaution or compensate victims for losses. They can,
however, remove the insult involved in a tort by disclaiming the meaning
inherent in the actions of an Evremonde, namely that the victim is a person
undeserving of respect and care.
Strict liability presents a stronger challenge to the idea of litigation as the
vindication of wronged honor. Indeed, I am inclined to side with Jane
Stapleton at this point and admit that certain aspects of the law of torts may
be best conceptualized in terms of compensation or loss spreading. 207 The
claims of such an approach seem strongest in the case of strict liability torts.
Yet even here, the idea of civil recourse as the vindication of wronged
honor is not completely without substance. Consider the classic strict
liability tort of engaging in some ultra-hazardous activity, such as using
explosives. 208 There are at least two ways of seeing the damages that could
flow from such an activity as an affront to someone’s honor. First, one
could note that the decision to use such explosives itself can be an insult.
This seems odd. The building demolition crew that uses C-4 and takes
every precaution not to harm anyone is not engaged in insulting behavior in
the same way that a negligent driver, for example, fails to show proper
respect for others. Yet the building crew has taken actions that it knows
may, despite its best efforts, result in harm to others. In this sense, it has
held the security of others as a thing it need not entirely respect.
The second way of thinking about strict liability and the vindication of
honor is to see the rule as serving an evidentiary function. The idea here is
that there are certain activities that are so dangerous that rather than proving
negligence, it may in effect simply be assumed. 209 If strict liability serves
this function then it may be seen as insulting in the same way that
negligence is seen as insulting, namely as a failure to show proper care. 210
The difference is that in the strict liability case the necessity of proving the
absence of care is dispensed with for idiosyncratic practical reasons.211
There are, of course, problems with this approach, the most striking being
that strict liability acts as more than simply an evidentiary presumption. It

207. See Stapleton, supra note 52, at 1538.
208. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1965) (listing elements of ultrahazardous activity tort).
209. See id. cmt. f.
210. See id. § 281 (noting duty of care as one of the elements of a negligence tort).
211. See id. § 519 cmt. d (“It is founded upon a policy of the law that imposes upon
anyone who for his own purposes creates an abnormal risk of harm to his neighbors, the
responsibility of relieving against that harm when it does in fact occur.”).
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forecloses the possibility of the defendant raising its non-negligent—indeed
exemplary—conduct as a defense. 212
3. Contract Law
Even accepting the arguments made above, one might contend that while
the vindication of wronged honor fits with actions such as libel, defamation,
and intentional torts such as fraud or battery, it is disconnected from
contract law. This objection could take two forms. The first is that the
doctrinal structures that define contractual liability simply do not pick out
situations involving insult or humiliation of the breachee. The second is
that the vindication of honor does not describe the motives of litigants in
contract cases.
To a certain extent the doctrinal objection has merit. For example, one
might imagine a law of contracts where the doctrines of formation were
organized so as to pick out the sort of agreements whose breach would
result in insult. Likewise, one could imagine that the doctrines surrounding
breach itself could be organized so as to allow a plaintiff to sue successfully
only when the breach could plausibly be seen as an insult to someone’s
honor. There are reasons to suppose, however, that whatever the structure
of such an imaginary legal system would look like, it does not closely
match the one that we have. For example, gratuitous promises, whose
breach might be deeply insulting, are unenforceable unless they are
supported by consideration or fall into one of the exceptions to the
consideration rule. 213 Likewise, contract law generally treats a wholly
inadvertent and innocent breach no differently than a deliberately
humiliating one.
Despite these powerful arguments, however, there are doctrinal elements
in both formation and breach that do seem to protect wronged honor. If we
accept that the breach of deliberately made promises is to be treated as more
insulting than the breach of less well thought out contracts, then the
doctrine of consideration is less of a stumbling block than it initially
appears. As Lon Fuller long ago argued, the doctrine of consideration can
serve as a form as much as anything. 214 Formal requirements, in turn, serve
to pick out contracts that are more likely to be deliberately made and
considered, what Fuller called the precautionary and channeling functions
of consideration. 215 The same point could be made with contracts under
seal. 216 Likewise, the duty of good faith performance picks out a set of
212. See id. § 519 (“One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.”).
213. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the
Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1262 (1980) (“[G]ratuitous promises of gifts or
unilateral pledges to confer benefits remain legally unenforceable.”).
214. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941).
215. See id. at 800–01.
216. See id. at 801 (“To the business man who wishes to make his own or another’s
promise binding, the seal was at common law available as a device for the accomplishment
of his objective.”).
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contract breaches that do seem plausibly related to insults to one’s honor.217
This doctrine has frequently been used to provide a remedy against a
promisor whose conduct, while within the letter of the contract,
nevertheless constitutes an abuse of power or discretion. 218 For example, a
secured lender who uses his discretion to call a loan can be subject to lender
liability using a good faith theory if it can be shown that the exercise of the
discretion arose out of a personality conflict or other argument. 219
The motivation of parties in contract litigation may seem far removed
from questions of offended honor. Rather, much of the legal and scholarly
discourse around contracts assumes that parties are hard-headed economic
calculators. 220 Research in behavioral psychology, however, suggests
otherwise. People have more intense feelings of being wronged in cases
involving a relationship of trust. 221 Hence, researchers have found that
given identical economic damages, lay people will generally demand
greater compensation in cases where the damages are caused by breach of
contract rather than tort.222 In particular, people become more offended by
breach of contract the more they feel that they have been treated as
suckers. 223 Hence, intentional breaches call forth more intensity than
accidental breaches, and damages caused by breach of contract made with a
third party call forth less intensity. 224 In short the victim of breach who
feels exploited “is not only angry at the perpetrator, but he is also
humiliated and self-conscious. A sucker feels some self-blame for having
voluntarily engaged in a transaction with a scoundrel.” 225 There is thus
good evidence that lay people experience breach of contract as a form of
contempt, an affront to their sense of themselves, an attack on their honor.
Hence, one could see contract litigation as a form of retaliation against the
dishonoring breacher. 226
217. See generally Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition
and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
218. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The
Practice View, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1533, 1540–41 (1994) (noting one example
involving a dispute between farmer and buyer over timing of harvesting); see also Eric G.
Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 299, 332–48
(1988) (discussing cases involving this conception of good faith).
219. See K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing the
abuse of discretion by a secured lender and the resulting liability under the duty of good
faith).
220. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 101–08 (discussing economic incentives in contract
litigation).
221. See Cass Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 537–38 (2005)
(giving the example of the contrast between a theft by an anonymous pickpocket versus a
family babysitter).
222. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics
in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405, 419, 422 (2009).
223. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003, 1018 (2010) (“When people feel suckered and morally outraged, they are
particularly offended and in turn demand more compensation.”).
224. See id. at 1032–33 (interpreting results of experiments conducted).
225. Id. at 1018.
226. Id. at 1043 (“Our results suggest that, at a minimum, the experience of being
suckered makes people more likely to seek punitive or supracompensatory damages.
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CONCLUSION
Common law writers such as Coke and Blackstone saw the law as, in
part, protecting a man’s honor. “Lex est tutissima cassis,” declared Coke’s
family motto. 227 It was the law that formed the armor that protected the
weak from the insults of the strong. While modernity has sent much of the
rhetoric of honor underground, insult, humiliation, and the vindication of
stolen honor persist in our society, even if we choose to cloak them in the
euphemism of democratic rights or human dignity. The modern state
necessarily constrains much of our behavior, criminalizing the kinds of
feuds and retaliation that served in earlier times to vindicate one’s honor.
Dickens’s vision of the Marquis Evremonde in A Tale of Two Cities,
however, shows the evil of a world in which those who suffer humiliation
are without the means of acting against those who have harmed them. The
helplessness of victims in such a world in effect forces them to re-enact the
humiliation of the insult against them. This evil cannot be remedied by
becoming the passive recipient of self-respect that is dispensed like a
welfare right by the state. Rather, it is only in the agency of the victim in
either forgiving and forgetting the wrong or acting against the wrongdoer
that the humiliation of the wrong can be erased and the honor of the victim
reasserted.
The arguments in this Article suggest that ultimately the vindication of
honor provides a justification for civil recourse in the private law. Its
claims are strongest in cases of intentional torts and breaches of the duty of
good faith. It still has traction in the tort of negligence. When it comes to
strict liability torts, however, its relationship to the law seems more
tenuous. Ultimately, this muddy picture of the relationship between honor
and the private law is not surprising. No institutions as complicated and
long-lived as contracts and torts can be reduced to a single normative
concern. Presenting such reductionism as the sine qua non of theoretical
success is to condemn any attempt at interpretive theory to failure at the
outset. And yet despite its messy pluralism the common law is not without
its reasons, and we may hope for a theory that will render our law more
sensible and provide us with reasons for shifting it in one direction or the
other.
By the lights of this latter criteria, the vindication of honor offers some
success. It provides us with reasons for believing that our current legal
practices, in particular the practice of empowering wronged plaintiffs to act
against their victimizers, rests on normative foundations that can be
articulated in terms of honor. Furthermore, precisely because the
vindication of honor does not track well across every civil wrong, it
provides us with some critical bite. Liability in those areas of law such as
strict liability where it is most difficult to find a justification in the
vindication of honor are, ceteris paribus, less normatively justified than
However, when people feel insulted by breach of contract, they instead may pursue different
categories of legal remedies altogether.”).
227. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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those areas where the claims of honor seem stronger. Accordingly, for
example, we should be more concerned about attempts to replace tort law
with a system of no-fault social insurance in cases involving intentional
torts than in cases of strict liability for ultra-hazardous materials. Likewise,
the case for empowering plaintiffs to go after contract breachers is stronger,
on civil recourse grounds, in cases involving a breach of the obligation of
good faith. The idea of honor suggests revisiting the issue of fault in
contract law, considering whether it might be wise to differentiate between
intentional and inadvertent breaches.
Debates over tort reform provide other examples of honor’s potential
reach. Much of the controversy has centered on the question of punitive
damages. Numerous states have passed statutes that limit the availability of
such damages to cases where “the defendant consciously or deliberatively
engaged in oppression, fraud, wantonness, or malice with regard to the
plaintiff.” 228 Likewise, in determining whether punitive damage awards
run afoul of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has “instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a
defendant by considering whether . . . the harm was the result of intentional
malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.”229 By focusing on intentional
or malicious behavior, the law picks out those situations that are likely to
result in the greatest insult to a plaintiff’s honor and protects his right to the
heightened recourse of punitive damages.
One might also employ the idea of honor critically. In this Article, I have
suggested that the process of litigation provides a fair fight between
litigants, one that allows a wronged party to re-establish her honor. While I
believe that such an interpretation of private litigation is defensible, it is
also true that it does not accord with many people’s subjective experience
of litigation. Far from being a dignified process, they may find the
intrusiveness of discovery, the delays of the court, and the abstruse legal
maneuverings of lawyers alienating and humiliating. On this view, the
legal system stands condemned of failing to provide the very thing that it
supposedly promises to private litigants. Even if one finds this darker view
of litigation compelling—and there are many reasons for doing so—it is
important to see the way in which the critique is strengthened by viewing
228. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (2010); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West
2010) (same); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (same); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (West 2010) (same).
229. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); see also
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008) (“Under the umbrellas of
punishment and its aim of deterrence, degrees of relative blameworthiness are apparent.
Reckless conduct is not intentional or malicious, nor is it necessarily callous toward the risk
of harming others, as opposed to unheedful of it.”); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S.
346, 355 (2007) (“Evidence of actual harm to nonparties can help to show that the conduct
that harmed the plaintiff also posed a substantial risk of harm to the general public, and so
was particularly reprehensible—although counsel may argue in a particular case that conduct
resulting in no harm to others nonetheless posed a grave risk to the public, or the converse.
Yet for the reasons given above, a jury may not go further than this and use a punitive
damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is alleged to have
visited on nonparties.”).
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private law through the lens of honor. The law’s failure and hypocrisy are
greater precisely because what the law promises is the recovery of lost
dignity.
Ultimately, however, the arguments put forward in this Article cannot lay
such controversies to rest. I have argued elsewhere that private law can and
does pursue multiple goals. 230 There is nothing inconsistent with seeing
compensation and more efficient incentives as parallel goals of private
litigation, even if there will necessarily be messy trade-offs between these
goals. The possibility of such pluralism, however, also casts in doubt the
ultimate value of using private law to vindicate lost honor. In this Article, I
have labored hard to show that honor and its vindication are values that
deserve greater modern respect than they receive. It cannot be denied,
however, that they have their costs. Indeed, if part of the value of private
law lies in the forum that it creates for struggle between the parties, then the
costs associated with litigiousness and conflict are a fixed part of
vindicating one’s honor through the law. These can no longer be seen
merely as unfortunate byproducts of a system set up to serve other
purposes, such as effective fact-finding and disaggregated enforcement.
The very point of litigation may be to let people fight. Indeed, by reducing
the risks of responding to insults—losing a lawsuit is not nearly as likely to
be fatal as losing a duel with pistols at twenty paces—the private law may
actually encourage this costly behavior. This Article has not attempted to
evaluate these costs, but they cannot be dismissed as trivial. In the end, a
reasonable person may conclude that the vindication of honor simply is not
worth the candle. Before she makes that decision, however, our reasonable
observer must grapple honestly with honor and the way in which our law
provides for its vindication. Forcing that question is the ultimate measure
of the success of this Article’s argument.

230. See Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483,
1498–1506 (2005) (book review) (arguing for a pluralistic approach to the interpretation of
contract law); see also Oman, supra note 20, at 867–74 (same).

